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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court
established a framework for protecting against discrimination in jury
selection.' Since then, the Batson doctrine's breadth has increased
considerably. Batson resolved the claim of an African American
criminal defendant from whose jury all African Americans had been
removed through peremptory strikes. Now, however, the Batson
doctrine applies to civil trials as well as criminal, to strikes by
prosecutors as well as defenders, and to discrimination on the basis of
gender as well as race.' Although the doctrine protects only against
purposeful discrimination, in Hernandez v. New York the Supreme
Court held that courts should give "appropriate weight" to the fact
that a peremptory strike's justification has a disparate impact on a
certain race when determining whether purposeful discrimination
motivated the strike.'
Despite the increased breadth of the Batson doctrine, this may not be
a happy anniversary for Batson.' Opponents accuse the current
framework of failing to provide meaningful protection against
purposeful discrimination,' and, specifically, of being vulnerable to an
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
2 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that
"gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and
impartiality"); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that "the
Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful
discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges");
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (holding that Batson
claims are cognizable in civil trials); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-84. "Peremptory
strikes," also known as "peremptory challenges," provide a means by which litigants
can remove potential jurors at the start of a trial. They serve "a number of purposes
that promote justice in adversarial proceedings." Arielle Siebert, Batson v. Kentucky:
Application to Whites and the Effect on the Peremptory Challenge System, 32 COLUM.J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 307, 309 (1999).
3 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991). The "disparate impact"
justifications with which this article is concerned are those that, while facially
"neutral," are more likely to apply to someone who shares the stricken juror's race,
ethnicity or gender than to someone who does not.
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 482 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, Batson Ethics] ("A quick look
at the cases expanding Batson's application to white-defendant/Black-juror cases, civil
cases, and defense peremptory strikes might suggest that the Court is very committed
to Batson. Those cases, however, also reveal a concomitant decrease in emphasis on
the minority-race defendant's rights that ultimately detracts from the likelihood of
reversals in even egregious cases." (footnotes omitted)).
' See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection:
Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 260 (2003)
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end-run that exploits disparate impact. In a society often stratified
along demographic lines, the possibility that, for example, an attorney
might mask purposeful racial discrimination with a justification based
on a juror's neighborhood, and be immune from Batson's protections
in doing so, has led some to despair of the protections and to call for
an end to the peremptory strike.6
Despite the risk that disparate impact poses to the Batson
protections, disparate impact analysis in the Batson context has
received insufficient scholarly attention, and has never been the
subject of a comprehensive study. This article examines all of the
federal court decisions relating to this issue that have been published
since Hernandez.' While this survey omits unpublished decisions, it
brings to light an intriguing disparity that is mirrored in other Batson
("[Tihe analyzed decisions suggest that Batson's inefficacy could potentially be
assisting in the maintenance of an environment in which racial discrimination in jury
selection is tantamount to a legitimate adversarial tool.").
6 See, e.g., Alexis Straus, (Not) Mourning the Demise of the Peremptory Challenge:
Twenty Years of Batson v. Kentucky, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 309, 310 (2007)
(noting that "although the Batson Court's intentions were good, the result has been a
messy, unworkable, subjective standard"). The commentators and judges who urge
the abolition of the peremptory strike are many. See, e.g., Amy Wilson, The End of
Peremptory Challenges: A Call for Change Through Comparative Analysis, 32 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 363 (2009) (arguing for the abolition of peremptory challenges
by examining their abolition in the United Kingdom). But see Douglas L. Colbert,
Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use
of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 100 (1990) ("Despite the often-heard
criticism that jury selection is a wasteful, nonproductive use of scarce judicial
resources, the defense challenge represents the best mechanism for guaranteeing an
accused the right to be judged by impartial jurors.") (footnote omitted). Their
grounds are far more numerous than the vulnerabilities of the disparate impact
analysis, and this Article will not attempt to address them, beyond making the point
that, in the disparate impact context, full exploration of the potential of the analytical
framework should be a condition precedent to calls for abolition of a longstanding
trial right.
I By "published," I mean "available on Westlaw." I conducted my search in the
allfeds database of Westlaw. My search was: "Batson & Hernandez & ('disparate
impact' 'disproportionate impact' 'discriminatory effect')" (originally my third and
final term was "disparate impact," but when my secondary research indicated that
courts used "disproportionate impact" and "discriminatory effect" as alternative
means of expressing the same idea, they were added). I eliminated Supreme Court
cases and cases that either conducted no disparate impact analysis or confined their
disparate impact analysis to Step 1 of the Batson test. My secondary research brought
to light four additional cases, which I then added to my data set: United States v.
Adams, 604 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 2010); Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 F.3d
933 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549 (9th Cir. 1996); and United
States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1996).
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research beyond the disparate impact context," and in other Equal
Protection scholarship. 9 Thirty-nine published decisions have
addressed disparate impact arguments in Batson cases since Hernandez.
Thirty-six decisions involved claims relating to stricken jurors who
were either people of color alleged to have been stricken because of
their race or ethnicity, or women alleged to have been stricken
because of their gender. All of the claims relating to those jurors were
ultimately unsuccessful. The remaining three decisions involved racial
discrimination claims relating to stricken jurors who were white. All
of the claims relating to those jurors were ultimately successful. While
this numerical disparity might arouse concern - that the disparate
impact doctrine is being utilized disparately - a further disparity may
temper that concern with hope. In comparing these two groups of
cases, there are differences not just in outcome, but also in judicial
approach. In several key areas, the depth of analysis was greater in
those cases where the stricken jurors were white; more attention was
given to the need to make the Batson protections an adequate check
against purposeful discrimination. This disparity should make one
pause before reaching the conclusion that the Batson framework
cannot adequately protect against justifications that have a disparate
impact.
This article highlights four key areas of difference in the approach
taken by the two groups of cases: the role of the trial judge, the
question of whether a justification for a strike must be connected to
the facts of the case, the application of the comparability principle,
and the expansion of the groups that the Batson doctrine protects. It
urges that the depth of analysis found in those four areas where the
rights of white jurors were at stake should be applied uniformly to all
disparate impact Batson claims. Part I surveys the development of the
Supreme Court doctrine relating to Batson, describes the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on disparate impact, and focuses on
parameters that the Supreme Court has set in these four key areas.
Part II highlights a disparity in result between the two groups of
8 See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAw 324 (6th ed. 2008)
("The result of the Batson advance is that it has enabled white men and women to
obtain the more fairly constituted juries for which blacks have sought for decades with
far less chance of success."); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have
Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 456
(1996) (examining all published cases from April 30, 1986, which is the date of the
Batson decision, through December 31, 1993, and finding that challenges made on
behalf of white jurors had a 53.33% success rate, while those made on behalf of
African American jurors had a success rate of 16.95%).
1 See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
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disparate impact cases in the lower federal courts. 1 Part III focuses on
a second disparity regarding disparate impact. It demonstrates that
courts analyzed the doctrine more deeply where the stricken jurors
were Caucasians, alleged to have been subject to racial discrimination.
The Conclusion asserts that it is premature to give up on the
peremptory strike until protections against its discriminatory use are
uniformly applied.
1. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
This Part lays out the Supreme Court backdrop against which the
lower federal courts have been operating. It describes the framework
that Batson sets out and introduces Hernandez v. New York, the case in
which the Supreme Court addressed disparate impact in the Batson
context." It then highlights the frameworks that other Supreme Court
cases have established regarding four issues that are crucial to
disparate impact analysis: the role of the trial judge, the question of
whether a justification for a strike must be connected to the facts of
the case, the application of the comparability principle, and the
expansion of the groups that the Batson doctrine protects.
A. Batson v. Kentucky
In Batson v. Kentucky, an African American criminal defendant
alleged discrimination in the prosecutor's removal of every African
10 In this Article, I focus on federal case law, although the habeas cases necessarily
implicate state court decisions. My focus on federal law is motivated in part by the fact
that, at the state level, the patchwork of legal frameworks is more complex. Batson
"establishes the floor for challenging race based peremptory strikes," a floor that has
been exceeded by many states' interpretations of their own constitutions. State v.
Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 347 (Minn. 1998); see, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886,
889 (Minn. 1991) (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court may apply a "more
stringent standard of review" as a matter of state law). This potential for differing
approaches may be particularly salient in the disparate impact context. See Danielle
Ward Mason, Racism on Our Juries: The Impossibility of Impartiality in Capital Cases, 12
JONES L. REv. 169, 194 (2008) (noting that states are not precluded "from developing
their own system for dealing with racial discrimination in jury selection or using
statistical data as an evidentiary showing of disparate impact regarding peremptory
challenges"). A recent report from the Equal Justice Initiative points out that many of
the same phenomena that I identify in the federal system are at play in state courts
across the South; I will highlight the parallels throughout the Article. See EQUAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING
LEGACY 16-18 (2010), [hereinafter "EJI REPORT"], available at http://eji.org/ejilfiles/
EJI%20Race%20and%20Jury%2OReport.pdf.
" See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 82-84 (1986).
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American from his jury through peremptory strikes. 12 The Court held
that Batson's claim was properly resolved under the Equal Protection
Clause, and established a three-step test for evaluating discrimination
claims regarding the use of peremptory strikes. This test forms the
basis of today's assessment of such claims.
At Step 1 of the Batson analysis, the attorney objecting to the use of
a peremptory strike must establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination.' This is accomplished "by showing that the totality of
the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose."' 5 At Step 2, the Batson Court required the striking attorney
to "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried."' 6 The Court required that the explanation be a clear and
reasonably specific articulation of the attorney's "legitimate reasons"
for the strike." At Step 3, the trial court has "the duty to determine if
the defendant has established purposeful discrimination,"" and thus a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 9 The court's determination
"largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." 20 The Batson Court
declined to mandate "particular procedures" for courts to follow in
their implementation of this three-step analysis.2 '
The Batson Court indicated that discrimination in jury selection
harms three parties: the defendant, the excluded juror, and the entire
community. 22 The harm to the entire community stems from the fact
12 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79, 82-84.
13 See id. at 93-98.
14 Id. at 94.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 98.
17 Id. at 98 n.20.
18 Id. at 98.
19 The Batson analysis applies to federal as well as state cases, since the Supreme
Court:
[Hias established that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
impliedly imposes the same obligations on the federal government as does
the Equal Protection Clause on the states, and any alleged violations of those
obligations are analyzed in the same way as an alleged violation of the Equal
Protection Clause by a state actor.
United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.5 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
20 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
21 Id. at 98 n.24 ("In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our
state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to
implement our holding today.").
22 Id. at 87.
2012] 1365
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that "[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude black persons
from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
of justice."23
The Court addressed the distinction between peremptory strikes,
which "ordinarily" can be exercised by the prosecutor "for any reason
at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the
outcome" of the case," and challenges for cause, which require the
striking attorney to meet a high bar of juror unsuitability." The Court
asserted that the distinction remained significant: while the Batson
analysis "imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory
character of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor's
explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge
for cause." 6
Additionally, the Court recognized that "[tihe reality of practice,
amply reflected in many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that
the [peremptory] challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has
been, used to discriminate against black jurors."27 The Court did not
address the applicability of the Batson doctrine beyond the context of
the case before it: an African American criminal defendant claiming
that the prosecution was purposefully discriminating against African
American jurors.
In resolving Batson's claim, the Court overruled its 1965 decision in
Swain v. Alabama to the extent that the prior case had placed a higher
evidentiary burden on the criminal defendant who alleged a violation
of Equal Protection through the use of peremptory strikes." The Swain
Court had denied an African American's claim relating to the
prosecutorial striking of six African Americans from his jury,2 9 finding
that Swain had failed to make out a prima facie case of
23 Id.
24 Id. at 89.
25 Id. at 97; see Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st
Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence's Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to
the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1175, 1191 n.84 (2008) ("The challenge for cause
is narrowly confined to instances in which threats to impartiality are admitted or
presumed from the relationships, pecuniary interests, or clear biases of a prospective
juror. The peremptory challenge is considerably more extensive in scope. It serves to
remove jurors who, in the opinion of counsel, have unacknowledged or unconscious
bias . . . . [Tihe peremptory permits rejecting for a real or imagined partiality that is
less easily designated or demonstrable.") (citing Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109,
1113 (9th Cir. 1981)).
26 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
27 Id. at 99.
28 Id. at 82, 100 n.25; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965).
29 Swain, 380 U.S. at 210, 226.
1366 [Vol. 45:1359
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discrimination.30 In light of the purpose and function of the
peremptory challenge, the Swain Court refused to hold "that the
striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection
of the laws."31 Rather, " [t]he presumption in any particular case must
be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair
and impartial jury."32 Whereas a state's "systematic striking of Negroes
in the selection of petit juries" might make out a prima facie case, the
record before the Court did not support such a finding.
The Batson Court noted that a number of lower courts had
interpreted Swain to mean that "proof of repeated striking of blacks
over a number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause."" The lower courts' approach had placed "a
crippling burden of proof"1 on defendants, which meant that
"prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny." 6 The Batson Court rejected this approach,
holding that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial."3 1
B. Disparate Impact Analysis
A few years after Batson, in Hernandez v. New York, the Supreme
Court focused on the role of disparate impact considerations within
the Batson analysis." In Hernandez, the prosecutor exercised the
strikes at issue against Spanish-speaking jurors, on the grounds that
they would have difficulty obeying the court's instructions to treat
only the interpreter's version of the Spanish-language testimony as
evidence.3 9 A plurality of the Court conceded that "the prosecutor's
criterion might well result in the disproportionate removal of
prospective Latino jurors," but found no clear error in the state court's
determination that there was no purposeful discrimination.
30 Id. at 205, 226.
31 Id. at 221.
32 Id. at 222.
33 Id. at 224.
34 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 92-93.
1 Id. at 96.
38 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991).
" See id. at 356-57. The plurality used the terms "race" and "ethnicity"
interchangeably throughout its opinion.
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The plurality rejected the notion that the disparate impact of a
justification might prevent that justification from being sufficiently
"race neutral" to satisfy Step 2. At Step 2, "the issue is the facial
validity of the prosecutor's explanation,"' and " [ulnless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral."4 ' According to the
plurality's analysis, a justification's "disparate impact" on a certain race
is relevant at Step 3 rather than Step 2. At Step 3, the disparate impact
is to be given "appropriate weight" in determining whether the
justification is a pretext for purposeful discrimination. Thus, even
while carving out a place for disparate impact analysis within the
Batson doctrine, the Hernandez plurality all but shut down Step 2 as a
forum for such claims.
C. Role of the Trial Judge
Throughout the Supreme Court's Batson jurisprudence, the Court
has consistently emphasized the importance of the role of the trial
judge within the Batson doctrine. The Hernandez plurality, for
example, emphasized the importance of deference to the trial court's
findings regarding discriminatory intent.44 As Batson noted, those
findings "largely will turn on evaluation of credibility," and
evaluations of that sort lie "peculiarly within a trial judge's
province."45 The demeanor of an attorney whose strike is under review
is often the best evidence of whether he or she harbors discriminatory
intent, and only the trial court is able to form an assessment thereof.46
In Snyder v. Louisiana, the Court emphasized that the trial court has
a "pivotal role" in evaluating Batson claims. Its responsibilities
include evaluating "not only whether the prosecutor's demeanor belies
40 Id. at 360.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 362.
1 At least one judge has interpreted the Hernandez plurality as seeming to
acknowledge with its statement that disparate impact "will not be conclusive in the
preliminary race-neutrality step of the Batson inquiry," Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362,
that "the disparate impact of an asserted criterion is relevant in determining whether it
is race neutral." People v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 190 (Colo. 1993) (quoting
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362). This interpretation has not been adopted in the federal
system.
4 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.
1 Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)).
46 Id.
47 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008).
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a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror's demeanor can
credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to
the juror by the prosecutor."48
D. Connection of the Justification to the Facts of the Case
In Batson, the Court established a requirement that the "neutral"
explanation proffered in response to a Batson challenge must be
"related to the particular case to be tried" in order to satisfy Step 2.'9
Yet in Purkett v. Elern, the Court backed away from that requirement."
In Purkett, a proffered justification that a juror had "long, unkempt
hair, a mustache, and a beard" was found to satisfy Step 2 in a case
with no apparent tonsorial connections." Explanations, the Purkett
Court held, need not make sense or even be "minimally persuasive" to
satisfy Step 2.52 They might be "silly or superstitious"" and pass
muster at Step 2, or they might be "implausible or fantastic,""
although in that case they "may (and probably will) be found to be
pretexts for purposeful discrimination" at Step 3." Thus, as with the
question of disparate impact, the Supreme Court indicated that a lack
of connection with the facts of the case was not salient at Step 2, but
indicated that there might be a place for this consideration within the
Step 3 analysis.
E. Comparability
In Miller-El v. Dretke, a recent habeas claim, the Supreme Court
added some muscularity to the Batson analysis."6 Applying a
4 Id.
4 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
50 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 770, 770 n.2, 771 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for retreating from Batson).
11 Id. at 769.
52 Id. at 768.
53 Id.
54 Id.
" Id. In Johnson v. California, the Court continued to sand the teeth of Step 2,
apparently backing away from the Batson requirement that at that stage "legitimate
reasons" be proffered. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171-73 (2005); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20 (1986). The Court declared that "even if the State
produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical justification for its strike, the case
does not end - it merely proceeds to step three." Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171.
6 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); see Laura 1. Appleman, Reports of
Batson's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How the Batson Doctrine Enforces a
Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 607, 627 (2005) (stating that
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"comparative juror analysis" to those jurors who were stricken by the
prosecutor and those who were not,57 the Court held that the state
court's conclusion that no purposeful racial discrimination had
occurred was unreasonable and erroneous.18 The Court declared that
"ilf a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist
applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted
to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination
to be considered at Batson's third step.""Jurors need not be "exactly
identical" for a comparative juror analysis to be performed; such an
approach would "leave Batson inoperable,"60 because "potential jurors
are not products of a set of cookie cutters."6' The Court also rejected
arguments that defense counsel's allegations of discrimination were
weakened by the fact that the prosecution had refrained from striking
some of the potential jurors of color." Comparability analysis attempts
to uncover purposeful discrimination, even as the prosecutor's
strategic acceptance of black jurors may have attempted to mask it.6 3
the Miller-El decision "strongly affirmed the core principle of Batson's three-part
test").
" See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241. "Comparative juror analysis" refers to "an
examination of a prosecutor's questions to prospective jurors and the jurors'
responses, to see whether the prosecutor treated otherwise similar jurors differently
because of their membership in a particular group." Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139,
1145 (9th Cir. 2006).
58 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266.
59 Id. at 241.
"0 Id. at 247 n.6.
61 Id.; see also Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination
by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 216 n.97 (2009) ("In its most recent decision
dealing with racially premised peremptory challenges, the Court also took a relaxed
approach to comparators. Although it found a number of bases to hold that the verdict
was compromised by the prosecutor's use of challenges, one factor was a comparison
between white jurors who were not excused and a black juror who was excused.")
(citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477-90 (2008)).
62 The Court stated that:
This late-stage decision to accept a black panel member willing to impose a
death sentence does not . . . neutralize the early-stage decision to challenge a
comparable venireman . . . . In fact, if the prosecutors were going to accept
any black juror to obscure the otherwise consistent pattern of opposition to
seating one, the time to do so was getting late."
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 250.
63 See id.
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F. Rights of the Potential Jurors
In Powers v. Ohio,' the Court held that a race-based strike of a juror
violates the juror's constitutional rights.5 Powers, a white defendant,
was found to have standing to object to the prosecutorial striking of
African American jurors."
The Court has expanded the scope of juror protection in subsequent
cases. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court held that a civil
litigant could bring a constitutional claim on behalf of a stricken
juror.67 In Georgia v. McCollum, the Court held that a prosecutor could
bring a claim on behalf of a stricken juror, alleging a Batson violation
by defense counsel.' The Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. held
that striking jurors on the basis of gender was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. In doing so, it upheld a claim brought on behalf of
stricken male jurors.70 in Johnson v. California, the Court indicated that
each of the three sets of interests mentioned in Batson - the rights of
criminal defendants, the rights of jurors, and the harm caused to the
entire community by discrimination in jury selection - is of a
constitutional dimension.n
These cases indicate that the Batson doctrine has undergone
significant developments since the Court first decided the case. Court
decisions demonstrate the expansion of Batson beyond the context of
an African American criminal defendant alleging discriminatory
strikes of African American jurors. The Supreme Court, however, has
still not heard a Batson claim alleging purposeful racial discrimination
against white jurors.72 In addition, review of the development of the
" Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
65 Id. The Court also stated that there was a statutory right to the same effect,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2006). Id. at 408.
66 See id. at 402-04.
67 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1991). In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied upon a finding that civil litigants were functioning as
state actors in their exercise of peremptory challenges and thus were subject to the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 617.
68 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992). This outcome relied on a finding
that defense attorneys were state actors in the context of claims of discrimination in
jury selection. Id. at 54.
61 SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
70 Id. at 129.
71 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171-72 (2005). The harm to the
community lies in "the State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group
stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-
sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
7 See Maisa Jean Frank, Challenging Peremptories: Suggested Reforms to the Jury
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Batson framework indicates that it presents both limitations and
opportunities to parties bringing disparate impact claims. One
limitation is the stripping of substance from Step 2, which now
requires no connection between a proffered justification and the facts
of the case, and involves no analysis of disparate impact. One
opportunity is the fact that at Step 3 both the connection to the facts
of the case and disparate impact are relevant. A second opportunity is
the fact that by abandoning Swain and invoking community interests,
the Batson Court demonstrated that the selection of every jury must be
fair, and must be perceived as fair. Finally, the fact that each trial
judge has the freedom to devise the best ways to meet these goals,
protected by deference and by the Supreme Court's refusal to mandate
particular procedures, creates the opportunity for bold and creative
judicial action.
Part III will examine the treatment of these four factors in lower
court decisions; Part II introduces those decisions. The decisions fall
into two groups: the thirty-six decisions in which claims alleging
discrimination against jurors of color and/or female jurors were
ultimately unsuccessful, and the three decisions in which claims
alleging racial discrimination against white jurors were ultimately
successful.
II. LOWER FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT
ARGUMENTS
Several federal courts have indicated that justifications for
peremptory strikes that cause a disparate impact should be examined
more carefully than those that do not." Few of these cases, however,
Selection Process Using Minnesota as a Case Study, 94 MINN. L. REv. 2075, 2092 n.126
(2010) ("Although no U.S. Supreme Court precedent addresses this issue, some lower
courts have extended Batson to the exclusion of white jurors.") (listing cases).
" See, e.g., United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
a court presented with an explanation such as a juror's having been educated outside
of the United States in a language other than English should consider it with care to
ensure that the concerns about language are warranted and are not merely a pretext
for racial or national origin discrimination); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 872 (3d
Cir. 1994) ("Because language-speaking ability is so closely correlated with ethnicity,
a trial court must carefully assess the challenger's actual motivation even where the
challenger asserts a rational reason to discriminate based on language skills."); United
States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that the
prosecutor's explanation, "if generally applied, would be likely to have a disparate
impact on blacks in the vicinage and, accordingly, is one that should be scrutinized
with care"); Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[Clourts should
be very wary of allowing gang membership to be an acceptable ground for striking
jurors, particularly absent any gang involvement in the offense. This reasoning is
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provide any guidance as to what that careful examination might
involve." Moreover, in the cases involving claims of discrimination
against jurors of color on the basis of race or ethnicity, or against
female jurors on the basis of gender, disparate impact arguments never
triumphed. The only published disparate impact decisions that were
ultimately resolved with a finding of purposeful discrimination against
stricken jurors were those in which the stricken jurors were white."
Those cases in which disparate impact arguments were addressed in
the context of claims that jurors of color and/or female jurors were
stricken in violation of Batson will be addressed under the heading
"Jurors of Color and/or Female Jurors." Those in which disparate
impact arguments were addressed in the context of race-based claims
that white jurors were stricken in violation of Batson will be addressed
under the heading "White Jurors." Under each heading, this Part will
lay out the nature of the disparate impact claims, and the response to
those claims.
A. Jurors of Color and/or Female Jurors
In thirty-six post-Hernandez decisions," lower federal courts
resolved Batson claims in which disparate impact arguments were
particularly suspect when black defendants are being tried for an offense against a
white victim.").
" For the closest that the courts come to offering guidance, see Uwaezhoke, 995
F.2d at 393 (noting that a trial judge may be justified in concluding that
discriminatory intent has played a role in the challenge "when the disparate impact is
great and any legitimate concern of the prosecutor slight"). See also Pemberthy, 19
F.3d at 872 ("If the circumstances are such that a reasonable attorney would not be
concerned about translation problems, the trial judge should be more suspicious that
the attorney's motivation is illicit.").
" United States v. Wynn, 20 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12-13, 15 (D.D.C. 1997); United
States v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. July 11,
1995), affd, 92 F.3d 1313, 1330 (2d Cir. 1996).
76 United States v. Adams, 604 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Green, 599 F.3d 360, 377 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hibbler, 193 F. App'x 445,
451 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Dejesus,
347 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2003); Ladd v. Cockerell, 311 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir.
2002); Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 920 (6th Cir. 2002); Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse
Club, Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2001); Ellis v. Newland, 23 F. App'x 734,
736 (9th Cir. 2001); Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 855 (10th Cir.
2000); United States v. Brown, No. 97-4121, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15108, at *10 (6th
Cir. June 30, 1999); United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1998);
Devoil-El v. Groose, 160 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bauer, 84
F.3d 1549, 1554 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053, 1060 (5th
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raised in relation to stricken jurors who were either female and
allegedly stricken on the basis of their gender, or people of color and
allegedly stricken on the basis of their race or ethnicity. In all of those
thirty-six decisions, the final result was a denial of those claims. 7
Thirty-three of the thirty-six decisions resolved Batson claims based
on race or ethnicity. Four of these cases were civil suits: in three of
them, the plaintiff brought the Batson claim;79 in the fourth, the
defendant brought the claim."o The other twenty-nine decisions arose
from criminal trials in which the defendant, a person of color, alleged
that the prosecution engaged in purposeful racial or ethnic
discrimination in its strikes of jurors of color.8 1 Some of the twenty-
Cir. 1996); Sayrie v. Penrod Drilling Corp., No. 95-30259, 1995 WL 581672, at *1 n.3
(5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1995); United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994);
Canoy, 38 F.3d at 897; United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 635 (1st Cir. 1994);
Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Clay Props., Inc., No. 93-2353, 1994 WL 525873, at *3 (4th Cir.
May 12, 1994); United States v. Davenport, No. 93-1216, 1994 WL 523653, at *6 (5th
Cir. Sept. 6, 1994); Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 865; United States v. Brooks, 2 F.3d 838,
840 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1993);
Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 392; Williams, 957 F.2d at 489; United States v. Johnson, 941
F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991); Davis v. Purkett, No. 4:06CV1041-DJS, 2008 WL
4449427, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2008); Johnson v. Quarterman, No. 3:03-CV-
2606-K, 2007 WL 2735638, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2007); Chandler v.
Netherland, No. Civ.A. 96-0966-R, 1997 WL 461907, at *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 4, 1997);
Ware v. Filion, No. 04 Civ. 6784 (PAC)(FM), 2007 WL 1771583, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
19, 2007); United States v. Franklyn, No. S1 96 CR. 1062 (DLC), 1997 WL 334969, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997); United States v. Thomas, 943 F. Supp. 693, 697 (E.D.
Tex. 1996); Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 776 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
n In two instances, the claims of parties alleging disparate impact were succesful
at one stage of the litigation before subsequently being laid to rest. Heno, 208 F.3d at
855 (reversing lower court finding of Batson violation); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 800 F.
Supp. 144, 168 (D.N.J. 1992), rev'd, 19 F.3d 857, 873 (3d Cir. 1994).
78 Tinner, 308 F.3d at 699; Heno, 208 F.3d at 850-51; Sayrie, 1995 WL 581672, at
*1; Vigilant Ins. Co., 1994 WL 525873, at *1.
7 Tinner, 308 F.3d at 703; Heno, 208 F.3d at 856; Sayrie, 1995 WL 581672, at *1.
8 Vigilant Ins. Co., 1994 WL 525873, at *2.
8 Adams, 604 F.3d at 601; Hibbler, 193 F. App'x at 451; Houston, 456 F.3d at
1334; Beverly, 369 F.3d at 527; DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 507; Ladd, 311 F.3d at 355;
Bartholomew, 310 F.3d at 920; Ellis, 23 F. App'x at 736; Brown, 1999 WL 486624, at
*3; Roberts, 163 F.3d at 998; Devoil-El, 160 F.3d at 1186; Bauer, 84 F.3d at 1554;
Moeller, 80 F.3d at 1061; Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 863; Canoy, 38 F.3d at 897; Davenport,
1994 WL 523653, at *6; Perez, 35 F.3d at 635-36; Brooks, 2 F.3d at 840; Changco, 1
F.3d at 839; Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 390; Williams, 957 F.2d at 489; Johnson, 941 F.2d
at 1105; Purkett, 2008 WL 4449427, at *2; Johnson, 2007 WL 2735638, at *2; Ware,
2007 WL 1771583, at *3; Chandler, 1997 WL 461907, at *9; Franklyn, 1997 WL
334969, at *3; Thomas, 943 F. Supp. at 697; Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
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nine originated in the state system and reached the federal courts as a
result of habeas petitions;8 2 others originated in the federal system."
In the claims based on racial or ethnic discrimination, disparate
impact arguments most frequently targeted prosecutorial justifications
relating to the criminal justice system. Such justifications included
having relatives who were in the criminal justice system,84 were
convicted,85 or were incarcerated;8 6 having a criminal history,87
including having been charged with a crime;" having a negative
attitude toward,89 or negative experiences with, the police;90 having
been a victim of a crime;91 and opposing the death penalty. 2
In addition to justifications relating to the criminal justice system,
several other types of justification were common in these disparate
impact cases. One set of justifications related to views on, or
experience with, discrimination. Those justifications included
knowing someone who had filed a discrimination claim;93 a feeling of
having been discriminated against in the workplace;9 and believing in
the necessity of affirmative action.95 Neighborhood-based justifications
82 Ladd, 311 F.3d at 351; Ellis, 23 F. App'x at 735-36; Devoil-El, 160 F.3d at 1185-
86; Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 858-59; Williams, 957 F.2d at 488; Davis, 2008 WL
4449427, at *1; Johnson, 2007 WL 2735638, at *1; Ware, 2007 WL 1771583, at *2;
Chandler, 1997 WL 461907, at *1; Wylie, 773 F. Supp. at 776.
83 These consist of both trial-level decisions and appeals. See Adams, 604 F.3d 596,
601; United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 377 (4th Cir. 2010); Hibbler, 193 F. App'x
at 451; United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2006); Beverly, 369
F.3d at 527; Dejesus, 347 F.3d at 507; Bartholomew, 310 F.3d at 920; Brown, 182 F.3d
919 at *4; Roberts, 163 F.3d at 1000; Bauer, 84 F.3d at 1555-56; Moeller, 80 F.3d at
1060; Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 873; Davenport, 36 F.3d 89 at *7; United States v. Davis,
40 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994); Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 901(7th Cir. 1994); Perez,
35 F.3d at 636; Brooks, 2 F.3d at 841; Changco, 1 F.3d at 842; Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at
395; Johnson, 941 F.2d at 1110; Franklyn, 1997 WL 334969, at *6; Thomas, 943 F.
Supp. at 698.
8 Bartholomew, 310 F.3d at 920.
8 Houston, 456 F.3d at 1336; Beverly, 369 F.3d at 527;Johnson, 914 F.2d at 1109.
86 Beverly, 369 F.3d at 527; Ellis, 23 F.App'x at 736; Brown, 1999 WL 486624, at *2.
87 Ladd, 311 F.3d at 356.
88 Devoil-El v. Groose, 160 F.3d 1184, 1186 (8th Cir. 1998).
89 Id.; Johnson v. Quarterman, No. 3:03-CV-2606-K, 2007 WL 2735638, at *14
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2007).
90 United States v. Brooks, 2 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1993).
' Devoil-El, 160 F.3d at 1186.
9 Chandler v. Netherland, No. Civ.A. 96-0966-R, 1997 WL 461907, at *7 (W.D.
Va. Aug. 4, 1997).
9 Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2002).
9 See Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 855 (10th Cir. 2000).
9 See id.
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included living or working "near the base of operations of the
defendant's gang;"9 6 living in the same area as a government witness;97
"hanging out" in the area where the crime was alleged to have
occurred;" being from the area where the defendants, the alleged
victim and certain witnesses lived;99 working for an inner city housing
authority;' living in Gary, Indiana;'o' having a connection with the
Bronx;102 and having attended the same school as the plaintiff. 03
These disparate impact decisions also analyzed a variety of
language-related justifications. They included receiving education
outside the United States in a language other than English;' speaking
Spanish in a case where translations were expected to be hotly
contested;10 5 and having questionable English-language abilities.10 6
Certain other socio-eonomic and demographic justifications were
also popular. Family-related justifications included being a single
parent of a young child;' being single; 0 8 having three children;' 9 and
caring for grandchildren. 0  Other socio-economic justifications
included being unemployed or never employed;"' having "no stake in
the community;"" renting one's home;" 3 lacking a high school
96 Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1992).
97 United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1554 (9th Cir. 1996).
98 Davis v. Purkett, No. 4:06CV1041-DJS, 2008 WL 4449427, at *17 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 26, 2008).
99 Id.
100 United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 635 (1st Cir. 1994).
"0 United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
102 United States v. Franklyn, No. S1 96 CR. 1062 (DLC), 1997 WL 334969, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997).
103 Sayrie v. Penrod Drilling Corp., No. 95-30259, 1995 WL 581672, at *2 (5th Cir.
Aug. 31, 1995).
" United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994).
105 Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 869 (3d Cir. 1994).
106 United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1993).
1o7 Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Clay Props., Inc., No. 93-2353, 1994 WL 525873, at *3 (4th
Cir. Sept. 27, 1994).
10 United States v. Davenport, No. 93-1216, 1994 WL 523653, at *6 (5th Cir. Sept.
6, 1994); United States v. Thomas, 943 F. Supp. 693, 697 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
109 Davenport, 1994 WL 523653, at *6.
"0 Ware v. Filion, No. 04 Civ. 6784 (PAC)(FM), 2007 WL 1771583, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2007).
"' Devoil-El v. Groose, 160 F.3d 1184, 1186 (8th Cir. 1998); Sayrie v. Penrod
Drilling Corp., No. 95-30259, 1995 WL 581672, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1995);
Davenport, 1994 WL 523653, at *6; Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
112 Davenport, 1994 WL 523653, at *6.
113 United States v. Adams, 604 F.3d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 2010).
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education;"' and personal circumstances that were said to suggest
involvement in drugs."' Prosecutors also claimed to have stricken
jurors because they had a strong affinity to the Bible or Bible studies;"'
were young;' and were not wearing coats and ties."'
The three remaining decisions resolved claims of discrimination
based on gender."' In two of these cases, the defendants claimed that
striking teachers effected purposeful discrimination against women.120
In the third case, the defendant claimed that striking jurors because
they lacked business experience had the same purpose.' 2 '
None of the disparate impact arguments in these cases - whether
made by a criminal defendant, civil plaintiff, or civil defendant -
ultimately prevailed.
B. White Jurors
In contrast to the thirty-six post-Hernandez decisions in which
disparate impact arguments ultimately failed, courts found Batson
violations in three decisions where race-based disparate impact
arguments were applied to criminal defense attorneys' strikes of white
jurors. These decisions stemmed from the criminal trials of people of
color. Before a comparative discussion in Part III of the four analytic
elements that this article highlights as crucial to the Batson doctrine,
this subpart lays out the salient factual circumstances and arguments
from the small group of cases involving stricken white jurors.
1. United States v. Wynn
In United States v. Wynn, the District Court of the District of
Columbia decided Aaron Wynn's motion to reinstate the jury that had
been selected at the start of his trial.' 22 The court laid out the
circumstances that had led to the jury's discharge. Defense counsel
had stricken "every white venire member available to be seated on the
"1 United States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053, 1060 (5th Cir. 1996).
"1 United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1993).
116 United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2003).
" United States v. Hibbler, 193 F. App'x 445, 447 (6th Cir. 2006).
" Ladd v. Cockerell, 311 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2002).
"9 United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2010); Alverio v. Sam's
Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Davis, 40
F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994).
120 Green, 599 F.3d at 376-77; Davis, 40 F.3d at 1077.
121 Alverio, 253 F.3d at 940.
122 United States v. Wynn, 20 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1997).
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jury - a number totaling eight of the nine white venire members.""'
The prosecution had then brought a Batson challenge.' The court had
found that at Step 1, the prosecutor had made out a prima facie case.'25
The court had found defense counsel's proffered justifications
incredible, declared a Batson violation and a mistrial, and discharged
the jury."'
In ruling on the motion to reinstate the jury, the court found that
defense counsel had failed to meet its burden of showing that the
court's prior ruling was "erroneous.""' The court noted that
peremptory strikes are to be exercised only "under the careful control
of the court"2 8 and that "close scrutiny is to be employed at all times
during the selection of a jury to ensure that expressions of racial
prejudice find no place in the exercise of peremptory challenges.""'
The court's resolution of Steps 1 and 2 of the Batson framework was
swift. The court found that the prosecution had satisfied Step 1.130
Defense counsel had used eight of the ten peremptory strikes that it
exercised to remove whites from the jury."' At Step 2, defense counsel
had "rested the exercise of his peremptory strikes on either the age,
occupation, relationship or connection to law enforcement personnel,
or residence of each venire person struck," thus meeting the Step 2
burden.13 2
The court divided its Step 3 analysis into two sections: "Inconsistent
Application of Selection Criteria" 3 and "Disparate Impact of Defense
Counsel's Selection Criteria."' In the first section, the court stated
that "[wihen a party bases its peremptory challenges on certain
characteristics such as age or employment status, pretext can be
demonstrated by evidence that stricken panel members of one racial
group are similarly situated or share the characteristics of a non-
stricken panel member of a separate racial group.""' The court




127 Id. The court stated that in making its motion, the defense was seeking
"extraordinary relief," but proceeded on the assumption that such relief was available. Id.
128 Id. at 11.
129 Id
130 Id. at 12.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 13.
133 Id. at 13-14.
1' Id. at 14-15.
135 Id. at 13.
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concluded that defense counsel's justifications were "applied
inconsistently to members of different races,"' 3 6 and that they were "a
pretext for discriminatory elimination of white [jurors] ."
In the section on disparate impact, the court analyzed a reason that
defense counsel had given for striking six of the eight jurors at issue:
they lived or were employed in the upper northwest area of
Washington, D.C.' 3  The court reproduced that portion of the
transcript in which defense counsel had explained his use of this
criterion:
I think that's one of the factors among many, but I think that
people that come from that area may not - regardless of race
- haven't had as much contact with police officers, or at least
I think their contacts with a police officer I think are different
than people who live in Northeast or Southeast Washington.
In my opinion or my experiences have not had encounters or
many encounters where police officers are untruthful or where
they harass them and things of that nature. 139
The court noted that the disparate impact of this criterion was
"clear."o4 0 It stated that "[w]hen a party relies on criteria such as
residence that ultimately results in the exclusion of a certain group
from jury service, it is necessary to determine whether such criteria
[sic] is, in fact, a proxy for race.""' Residence can be used when it
connects a specific juror to the facts of the case.142 In this instance,
however, where the jurors' residence had "no cognizable connection"
to the facts of the case,'43 it "can only be stated that residence is
nothing more than a proxy for race."44 The court concluded that
peremptory strikes must be "closely scrutinized to ensure that even




131 Id. at 14-15.
1' Id. at 14.
140 Id.
14 Id. at 14-15.
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2. United States v. Taylor
In addition to Wynn, two published opinions have addressed
disparate impact claims relating to white jurors: an Eastern District of
New York opinion in United States v. Taylor'6 and the Second Circuit
affirmation thereof.147 Both opinions dealt with the jury selection,
presided over by Magistrate Judge Ross, in the trial of Merton Taylor
and his co-defendants. The defendants, all of whom were African
American or Latino, were "members of or associated with an
organization commonly known as United Brooklyn.""' "United
Brooklyn was one of a number of 'minority labor coalitions.' "149 The
prosecution alleged that these coalitions subjected the construction
industry to extortionate conduct to increase the hiring of coalition
members."o The defendants argued that their conduct involved legal
efforts to obtain minority jobs from employers who illegally failed to
provide them.' 5' This was the second of the so-called "coalition" trials
that District Judge Korman heard.' The first trial, which involved a
different group of defendants, resulted in the acquittal of all but one of
the defendants. 153 One of the attorneys from the first trial also
represented a client in the trial before the court."
a. Magistrate Judge Ruling
The district court opinion describes Magistrate Judge Ross's ruling
on the prosecution's Batson challenge."' After the defendants used
each of their first eight peremptory strikes against white jurors, the
prosecution raised an objection."' The magistrate judge required the
defendants to supply a race-neutral explanation. 7 Magistrate Judge
Ross found that while the defendants had met their Step 2 burden,
they had "exercised their peremptory challenges, at least in part,
116 United States v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995).
1 United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1327 (2d Cir. 1996).




152 Taylor, 1995 WL 875460, at * 1.
1 Id.
'5' Taylor, 92 F.3d at 1319 n.3.
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guided by race-based considerations."' 5 As a result, she applied a
"dual motivation" analysis.' 9 This shifted the burden to the
defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they
would have exercised the challenges if race were not a factor.' Of the
eight peremptory challenges at issue, Judge Ross held that the
defendants "had met their burden with respect to six [jurors] and had
failed to do so with respect to two" of them.16'
b. District Court Opinion
In his published opinion, Judge Korman elaborated upon part of an
oral ruling that he had made on cross-appeals from Magistrate Judge
Ross's decision.' In that part of his oral ruling Judge Korman had
reversed Magistrate Judge Ross regarding four jurors whose strikes
Judge Ross had found permissible.'13 The district court stated:
This is one of the rare cases in which the defendants conceded,
and the United States Magistrate Judge independently found,
that "the defendants exercised their peremptory challenges, at
least in part, guided by race based considerations," and that it
was "a defense strategy ... to exercise the maximum number
of peremptories to eliminate white jurors, thus maximizing the
number of blacks and Hispanics on the petit jury." 164
Judge Korman stated that defense counsel's burden under a dual
motivation analysis was to "demonstrate not only that a race-neutral
characteristic is present, he must also explain the manner in which
this characteristic is 'related to the particular case to be tried,' i.e., why
a reasonable person would regard a juror possessing that race-neutral
characteristic as undesirable for that particular case." 165
For two of the four jurors in question, defense counsel's proffered
reason was that they lived on Staten Island. 166 Defense counsel
15 Id.
159 Id. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the appropriateness of a "dual
motivation" or "mixed motive" analysis in the Batson context. See Snyder v. Louisiana,
552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008) ("We have not previously applied this rule in a Batson case,
and we need not decide here whether that standard governs in this context.").




16 Id. at *3.
165 Id. at *5 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986)).
166 Id.
2012] 138 1
HeinOnline  -- 45 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1381 2011-2012
University of California, Davis
apparently argued that "residence on Staten Island was a basis for
challenging any juror who resided there"' 7 because "residence in this
'least heterogeneous borough' would 'correlate [] to a larger than
average likelihood of racial antagonism.' "16 In response, Judge
Korman stated that by presuming that every white adult resident of
Staten Island could not render an impartial verdict, the defendants had
resorted to "constitutionally impermissible stereotyping."'69 Rather
than meeting their burden of demonstrating the race neutrality of the
challenge, "they concede that it is based on race."7 o Thus, regarding
these two jurors, as with the two others under discussion, the court
found that the defense had failed to meet its burden. 7 1
The question remained of whether, regardless of defense counsel's
"concession," a strike of all Staten Island jurors would have been
problematic. After all, that region was "eighty-two percent white." 7 1
The court concluded that this statistic would indeed "raise a serious
question as to whether the challenge was merely part of a strategy" to
increase the number of minorities in the jury pool.17 3
Judge Korman's conclusion was strongly worded. He noted that in
the first of the "coalition" trials, "discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges proceeded without objection." 7 In that trial, "a jury was
selected that did not represent a fair cross-section of the community
and the right of the prospective jurors to the equal protection of the
laws was blatantly violated.""'7 In this trial, by contrast, the jury
composition showed that "it is possible to assemble a jury made up of
167 Id.
168 Id. (quoting letter from defense counsel). The court described this as "an
argument that by its terms applies only to white residents." Id. The court quoted from
a "conce[ssion]" from defense counsel that "a juror [who] was from Staten Island and
was black would probably, you know serve to balance [defendants'] concerns about
Staten Island." Id. The court also quoted an observation from Judge Ross that another
potential juror, who was African American, "was not stricken by defendants although
... she also comes from Staten Island." Id.
169 Id. The court also stated that "the defendants' admission that their challenge
was directed solely to white jurors from Staten Island makes it impossible for them to
show that the challenge on the basis of residence would have been made if race was
not a factor." Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at *6, *9.
172 Id. at *5.
173 Id.
1 Id. at *11.
1 Id. The jury in the first trial was "approximately 80% Black and Latino." United
States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1329 (2d Cir. 1996).
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a cross-section of the community without tolerating wholesale
violations of the rights conferred by the Equal Protection Clause.""'
c. Circuit Court Opinion
In affirming the defendants' convictions, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed jury selection."' Its analysis revealed a fact
absent from the district court opinion: after the prosecutor had made a
Batson challenge on behalf of the eight stricken white jurors, defense
counsel had "responded by objecting to the government's use of two of
their first three peremptories to strike Latino jurors.""' While the
magistrate judge found the prosecution's reasons for one of the strikes
"unpersuasive," she sustained the strike because there was no
evidence of purposeful discrimination;" 9 she also sustained the other
strike. 8 0
The circuit court noted that in response to cross-appeals from Judge
Ross's ruling, the district court had asked both sides to submit
affidavits "stating whether race was a factor in the determination to
strike each juror." ' 8 Defense counsel affirmed on the record the truth
of the following statement: "For every juror who was excluded, there
were a number of factors. For some jurors, race is a factor. In no juror
was race the sole factor." 82
The circuit court rejected the argument that, in the case of the white
juror under consideration,' the district judge had required defense
counsel to present reasons for the strike that rose to the level of
challenges for cause. 8 1 It also rejected the argument that reliance by
the district judge and magistrate judge on events in the first of the
"coalition" trials had been inappropriate,"' especially in light of the
176 United States v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995).
177 Taylor, 92 F.3d at 1318.
178 Id. at 1320.




183 Over the objections of defense counsel, the circuit court addressed the strike of
only one juror, on the grounds that of the four jurors under discussion at the district
court level he was the only one who was on the jury during its deliberations. Id. at
1325. One never sat on the petit jury, and two were excused during trial. Id. The juror
whose strike was addressed by the circuit court was unaffected by the Staten Island
criterion. Id.
184 Id. at 1328.
I8l Id. at 1329.
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absence of any Batson objection in that case.18 6 With respect to the
second argument, while the circuit court found the record "troubling
at first blush,"'18 it declined to find grounds for reversal.18
Part II has described the two sets of cases with which this article is
concerned; Part III will compare them. It will demonstrate the way in
which the courts analyzing disparate impact claims relating to strikes
of jurors of color allegedly based on race or ethnicity and strikes of
female jurors allegedly based on gender appeared to be hemmed in by
their view of Supreme Court restrictions on such claims. By contrast,
those analyzing race-based claims relating to strikes of white jurors
found the potential that the Supreme Court frameworks contain.
III. DISPARATE APPROACHES TO DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS
This Part provides more detail on the four factors that this article
identifies as crucial to the analysis of disparate impact claims in the
Batson context: the role of the trial judge, the question of whether a
justification for a strike must be connected to the facts of the case, the
application of the comparability principle, and the expansion of the
groups that the Batson doctrine protects. After analyzing each factor as
it has appeared in the cases involving jurors of color and/or female
jurors, this Part compares the approaches found in the white juror
cases. All too often the cases in the first group exhibit a straitened
view of Supreme Court precedent and conduct an analysis that lacks
depth. On the other hand, the cases analyzing white juror claims
plumb the Supreme Court framework to find its potential as a check
on purposeful discrimination. This depth of analysis should be
universally applied.
A. Role of the Trial judge
The role of the trial judge in addressing Batson challenges is
"pivotal."189 This is so for a number of reasons. First, the trial judge is
in the best position to make the credibility determinations on which
Batson depends. Credibility determinations are viewed as a crucial part
of the investigation into whether a strike is the product of purposeful




9 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008).
190 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).
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credibility,' and, sometimes, the credibility of the juror whom the
attorney seeks to strike.19 2
The second reason that the role of the trial judge is pivotal is that
the trial judge has considerable freedom in the Batson context. This
freedom comes from the fact that the Supreme Court has refrained
from specifying any particular procedures for the evaluation of Batson
claims.'13 It also comes from the extraordinary deference afforded to
the trial judge.194 An examination of the disparate impact cases
indicates that reviewing judges frequently see themselves as unable to
second-guess the denial of a Batson claim because of deference
considerations, even when something appears very amiss. Courts
permitted denials of Batson claims relating to jurors of color and/or
female jurors to stand even when they felt "considerable unease as to
191 Id.
192 Snyder, 522 U.S. at 477.
19' See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) ("Because the
obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge,
and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have
been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire.");
Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 490-91 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that trial judge has
discretion to determine best procedure to be used in any given case); Kelly v.
Withrow, 822 F. Supp. 416, 423 (W.D. Mich. 1993) ("It is clear, based on the case law
to date, that the nature and extent of a Batson hearing, if any, lies at least in the first
instance within the discretion of the trial court.").
'9 See Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We have only a cold
transcript to guide us while the trial judge was there to observe the jury selection -
day in and day out for six months."); EJI REPORT, supra note 10, at 22 ("More than
100 criminal defendants have raised Batson claims on appeal in Tennessee, but this
state's courts have never reversed a criminal conviction because of racial
discrimination during jury selection."); Mason, supra note 10, at 181 ("Decisions by
the trial court regarding the adequacy of the prosecutor's reason usually remain
undisturbed because of the Supreme Court's policy of trusting the sound judgment of
the trial judge. Consequently, 'it is agreed that all but the most egregious race-based
strikes of black jurors are unlikely to be reversed.' " (quoting William J. Bowers,
Benjamin D. Steiner & Maria Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 171, 177 (2001))). For the "double" deference applied by habeas courts in
the context of voir dire, see Davis v. Purhett, No. 4:06CV1041-DJS, 2008 WL 4449427,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2008) ("We regularly defer to the fact-findings of trial courts
because those courts are uniquely positioned to observe the manner and presentation
of evidence. Our deference to trial court fact-finding is doubly great in the present
circumstances because of the 'unique awareness of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding voir dire,' and because of the statutory restraints on the scope of federal
habeas review." (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d
484, 486 (8th Cir. 1990))). As noted below, it is somewhat troubling that Davis makes
no mention of Miller-El, a case that indicated that even habeas deference need not bar
intervention in the Batson context. See infra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
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the prosecution's purposes and reasons" for its strikes,' 95 and even
when justifications were offered that were "lame,"196 "highly
suspect,""' "thin,"I98 not "sound,"l9 "not . . . plausible,"2 00 based on a
"fantastic" proposition,20' based on reasoning that was "somewhat
farfetched,"202 or even "so flimsy that the possibility of pretext is
substantial."2 03 Even if the jury selection "raises substantial questions
about the conduct and candor of the prosecutor," 204 when "the
potential disparate impact of the prosecutor's grounds for [a] strike is
disturbing,"2 0' and "despite the presence of highly suspicious factors in
the government's explanation"20 6 - even factors that appear to be
pretextual0m - the claims are not resuscitated. Thus, deference makes
the trial judge's role crucial.
The third reason that the role of the trial judge is pivotal is that
multiple obligations compel the trial judge to protect against
discrimination in jury selection. The judge must create the "right
climate in the courtroom."20 s The judge must also "provide a fair tral
to all parties."209 Finally, the judge must fulfill the purposes of Batson,
1I Williams, 957 F.2d at 491.
196 United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 998 (7th Cir. 1998).
1 Williams, 957 F.2d at 490.
198 Id.
9 Roberts, 163 F.3d at 998.
200 Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
201 Roberts, 163 F.3d. at 999.
202 Davis v. Purkett, No. 4:06CV1041-DJS, 2008 WL 4449427, at *13 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 26, 2008).
203 Roberts, 163 F.3d at 999.
204 Id. at 1000.
205 United States v. Brown, No. 97-4121, 1999 WL 486624, at *4 (6th Cir. June 30,
1999).
206 United States v. Davenport, No. 93-1216, 1994 WL 523653, at *7 (5th Cir. Sept.
6, 1994).
207 Id.
208 See Johnson, Batson Ethics, supra note 4, at 507 ("[Alsking questions and
demanding real responses before approving strikes is part of setting the right climate
in the courtroom, a task that every good trial judge recognizes as part of his job.").
209 United States. v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A trial judge is
more than a moderator or umpire. His responsibility is to preside in the manner and
with the demeanor to provide a fair trial to all parties and his discretion in the
performance of this duty and management is wide.") (internal quotations omitted); see
also State v. Evans, 998 P.2d 373, 379 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (permitting trial judge
to raise Batson issue sua sponte, in light of judges' responsibility "to ensure that the
proceedings over which they preside are fair, both in actuality and in perception").
1386 [Vol. 45:1359
HeinOnline  -- 45 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1386 2011-2012
Disparately Seeking Jurors
including preventing the harm that redounds to the entire community
when public confidence in the justice system is lost.2 10
The importance of the judge's task provides a fourth reason why the
trial judge's role is pivotal. The trial judge attempting to protect
against discrimination in jury selection works against a historical
backdrop of judicial failures to provide that protection.2 11 The trial
judge also has a unique opportunity within the progression of a
criminal case to discuss explicitly the risk of racial discrimination, a
risk that many commentators see as pervading the criminal justice
system.' The trial judge who fails to protect against discrimination in
jury selection runs the risk of requiring that a new trial be ordered on
appeal, since Batson error is never harmless error.213 Thus judicial
210 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
" See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 6, at 14, 40 (noting that the colonial and post-
revolutionary justice system denied African Americans the right to bring lawsuits, and
serve on juries or as witnesses; in this way it "guaranteed virtual immunity against
criminal prosecution of the white master (and of the white population generally) for
assaults against black people").
212 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) ("The litigants are
harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of
the jury will infect the entire proceedings."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412
(1991) ("The influence of the voir dire process may persist through the whole course
of the trial proceedings."); Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1012 (2004) (citing empirical evidence that "blacks
and Hispanics receive more severe sentences than whites for the same crime"); Judging
the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2121 (2006) (explaining that the
criminal justice system "systematically exclude[s] racial minorities from its
decisionmaking processes while disproportionately imposing its burdens upon
them"); Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of
Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 561 (1998)
("[TIhere is plenty of statistical evidence that a disproportionate number of African
Americans are arrested, charged, and convicted for crimes, and some evidence that
they are disproportionately punished."); Nancy Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory
Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1701-03 (2006) (arguing that
Batson serves an important function by making race more salient for lawyers and
judges) (citing Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really
Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 997, 1026-27 (2003) (stating that white jurors are more attuned to
potential prejudice against an African American defendant when asked questions
about race during voir dire)).
213 See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 800 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.N.J. 1992); Johnson, Batson
Ethics, supra note 4, at 500 ("Certainly it is more efficient to secure the efforts of trial
court personnel than it is to require retrials. There will always be a reluctance to
reverse a conviction because the costs of retrying any case are high. Trial court actors,
not faced with those costs, can actually afford to be more singleminded in their
devotion to the Constitution - if they want to be.").
2012]1 1387
HeinOnline  -- 45 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1387 2011-2012
University of California, Davis
efficiency concerns mandating careful voir dire are at least as
compelling as those supporting speedy voir dire.
For all of these reasons, when discrimination in jury selection is
alleged, one might hope to see action by the trial judge that is
proactive, creative, and assertive.
A proactive judicial role is particularly appealing in response to the
prospect of an all-white jury because "the all-white jury is the very
harm that Batson and subsequent cases tried to avoid."2 14
Discrimination in jury selection inflicts harm on "the entire
community," resulting from the fact that "[slelection procedures that
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."215 A selection
procedure that results in an all-white jury threatens to undermine
such confidence. 16
Outside the disparate impact context, there is at least one example
of how proactive problem-solving relating to this issue might replace
handwringing. The court in United States v. Charlton, perceiving that
an all-white jury would be the result of the prosecutor's desired
strikes, invited the prosecutor to withdraw those strikes.' There was
thus no need to stretch the Batson doctrine, or to call anyone a liar, a
racist, or even a racialist;2 18 all that was required was a trial judge
214 Siebert, supra note 2, at 326; see also Colbert, supra note 6, at 2-4 ("Although
most scholars have condemned Swain as a green light to prosecutors' use of the
peremptory challenge to disqualify African-American jurors, and many have criticized
the effectiveness of the Batson remedy, few have addressed the crux of the wrong to be
remedied: the inherent injustice of the all-white jury."). Another reason why a
proactive judicial role is appealing in response to the prospect of an all-white jury is
the data indicating the extent to which diverse juries surpass all-white juries in their
ability to evaluate a case fairly. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is substantial reason to believe that the distorting
influence of race is minimized on a racially mixed jury."); EJl REPORT, supra note 10,
at 40-41 (citing research demonstrating that racial diversity significantly improves a
jury's ability to assess the reliability and credibility of witness testimony, evaluate the
accuracy of cross-racial identifications, avoid presumptions of guilt, and fairly judge a
criminally accused person).
215 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); see William E. Martin, Judicial
Toleration of Racial Bias in the Minnesota justice System, 25 HAMLINE L. REv. 235, 267
(2002).
216 See EJI REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 ("Research has shown that observers are
more likely to conclude that a trial is unfair when an all-white jury finds a defendant
guilty.").
217 United States v. Charlton, 600 F.3d 43, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2010).
218 See Peggy Cooper Davis, Law as Microagression, 98 YALE LJ. 1559, 1570, 1570
n.51 (1989) (using the term "racialist" to "describe judgments controlled by racial
stereotypes without adopting the accusatory tone suggested by the word 'racist' "
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playing a pivotal role in combating the prospect of an all-white jury.2 19
This decision to err on the side of constitutional protections, 220 rather
than a nonconstitutional allotment of peremptories,221 seems wise, in
light of the difficulty and importance of detecting purposeful
discrimination.
The trial judge's role in assessing Batson claims of racial
discrimination is particularly difficult.222 The court is charged with
determining whether an attorney who asserts a race-neutral reason for
striking a juror is, in fact, lying, and actually striking the juror on the
basis of race. Many point out that this role is difficult because any
finding of purposeful discrimination would require telling a "fellow
member of the bar" that he or she has been using race unlawfully. 23 It
may be especially difficult when the judge and the attorney frequently
share the same courtroom. In addition to the relational concerns,
(citing Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J.
420, 443 (1988))); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107
YALE L.J. 2619, 2657 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, Respectability] ("Why would a trial
judge so disregard his duty? Perhaps part of the answer is that the purposeful
discrimination standard forces a judge to choose between ignoring specious
justifications . . . or calling a fellow member of the bar a liar and a racist.").
29 Nancy Marder cites a similar example in the state context - a Cook County
Circuit Judge, who:
[A]nnounced during jury selection in at least three criminal trials that she
refused to seat all-white juries. In one jury selection, after eight jurors had
been selected, she announced: "I'm telling you folks, I don't know what you
all intend to do, but I have no intention of seating an all-white jury."
Marder, supra note 212, at 1711.
220 By contrast, "judges tend to give the benefit of the doubt to prosecutors" in this
regard. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 211 (1997). Some
commentators endorse this approach. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 215, at 268 ("It
might be appropriate for judges to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt before
making any finding that a prosecutor's stated reason is a pretext and the prosecutor
has in fact engaged in impermissible racial discrimination.").
221 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) ("[T]he Constitution does not
confer a right to peremptory challenges.").
222 See United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1989)
("So long as peremptory challenges are permitted, trial and appellate judges will
continue to have difficulty in ascertaining whether the prosecutor's motives in
exercising peremptory challenges are good or bad."); United States v. Thomas, 943 F.
Supp. 693, 698 (E.D. Tex. 1996) ("The Constitution provides the defendant with a
right to have a jury selected free from discriminatory selection procedures.
Nevertheless, a violation of this right is extremely difficult to determine.").
223 See, e.g.,Johnson, Respectability, supra note 218, at 2657.
224 See Antony Page, Batson's Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 177-78 (2005) (" B]ecause the trial court is
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there are many difficulties involved in the project of deciding whether
someone who asserts a reason other than purposeful discrimination is
telling the truth. As the petitioner in Davis v. Purkett argued, those
who harbor racial prejudice are "trained by social taboos" to hide it,
especially in settings such as the courtroom.225 An attorney's admission
of racial motivation would risk not only social sanction,226 but also
ethical sanction.227 Furthermore, such an admission would result in
the seating of a juror that the attorney wished, and had attempted, to
remove. 228
An additional difficulty that trial judges face in making Batson
determinations is that they often seek to evaluate the credibility of the
juror being stricken,2 in addition to the credibility of the striking
attorney, with the aim of determining how the first might affect their
evaluation of the second.23 0 Trial court practices only increase this
difficulty. The voir dire process may be short - possibly resembling a
"sideshow"2 1 - and may afford little opportunity to assess each
juror.232 In addition, the likelihood that the judge, no less than the
determining credibility, to refuse to accept a peremptory challenge is the equivalent of
calling the attorney a liar, and maybe racist or sexist as well. A judge is likely to be
reluctant to stigmatize a lawyer in this way. Such a determination is also likely to
color the rest of the trial, and other trials in jurisdictions where lawyers appear
frequently before the same judges.").
225 Davis v. Purkett, No. 4:06CV1041-DJS, 2008 WL 4449427, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 26, 2008); see PICCA & FEAGIN, TWO-FACED RAcISM: WHITES IN THE BACKSTAGE
AND FRONSTAGE, at x (2007) ("Much of the overt expression of blatantly racist
thought, emotions, interpretations, and inclinations has gone backstage - that is, into
private settings where whites find themselves among other whites, especially friends
and relatives.").
226 See Samuel R. Sommers & M.l. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge
Procedure, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 263 (2007) ("lElven if attorneys consciously and
strategically consider race during jury selection, they would be unlikely to admit it.
Such an admission would have immediate consequences, as it would comprise a
Batson violation. More generally, psychologists have noted that behavior is often
influenced by the desire to appear nonprejudiced and to avoid the social sanctions
that can follow from the appearance of racial bias.").
227 See Martin, supra note 215, at 268 ("The trial judge's task is complicated by the
reality that any finding of intentional discrimination may have serious ethical
implications for the prosecutor.").
228 See Page, supra note 224, at 252.
229 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 433 (1991) (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
230 Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477.
231 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
232 See, e.g., Nanninga v. Three Rivers Elec. Co-op., 236 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir.
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striking attorney, harbors unconscious, or implicit, bias creates the
risk that nothing will be corroborated other than bias.233
Given the difficulties involved in detecting and exposing
discrimination, particularly racial discrimination, one might hope to
see judges conducting careful and well-supported analyses of the racial
dynamics of a case. This might involve, for example, some judicial
acknowledgement of the existence of unconscious bias and its
potential role in jury selection and jury decision making. In addition
to decisions from other federal courts, Supreme Court opinions since
Batson have acknowledged the existence of unconscious bias on the
part of attorneys, jurors, and judges.m Even though Equal Protection
doctrine may not prohibit strikes that are motivated by unconscious
bias,235 there is no reason why it should bar judges from considering
2000) (stating that twenty minutes per side was not an abuse of discretion); Hicks v.
Mickelson, 835 F.2d 721, 725 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that it was not plain error for
trial judge to limit voir dire to fifteen minutes per side in civil case); Stephen R.
Diprima, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson and McCollum, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 888, 918-19 (1995) (suggesting that an extended voir dire would
provide the court with more information in order effectively to scrutinize challenged
strikes); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210-11 (2009) (showing that a sample of white judges
"demonstrated a statistically significantly stronger white preference than that observed
among a sample of white subjects obtained on the Internet").
233 See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 380 (1987) ("Judges are not immune from
our culture's racism, nor can they escape the psychological mechanisms that render us
all, to some extent, unaware of our racist beliefs."); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten
Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345,
353 (2007).
234 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267-68 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(referring to unconscious racism on part of prosecutor); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to unconscious racism on part
of jury); id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to unconscious racism on part
of jury); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 343-44 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(referring to unconscious racism on part of jury (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282, 301-02 (1950))); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (referring to unconscious racism on part of prosecutor and judge); United
States. v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 515 (7th Cir. 2005) (referring to unconscious
racism on part of jury); United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 (3d Cir.
1989) (referring to unconscious racism on part of prosecutor and judge).
235 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991). Some, however, have
asserted that "purposeful discrimination" can be established by evidence that is
consistent with a lack of conscious bias. See, e.g., id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "disparate impact is itself evidence of discriminatory purpose"); Ralph
Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter? Law,
Politics, & Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY LJ. 1053, 1058 (2009) ("Neither statutory nor
constitutional antidiscrimination law turns on the distinction between [conscious and
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the extent to which unconscious bias might affect their own decision
making, or the decision making of jurors.236
1. Jurors of Color and/or Female Jurors
In the cases involving jurors of color and/or female jurors, the hope
that trial judges might act proactively, creatively, and assertively often
remains unrealized.
In many cases, judges expressed concern at the prosecution's stated
justifications, but still upheld the strike. In United States v. Adams, for
example, "[tihe district court was troubled by the fact that the
government used a facially race-neutral rationale, renter status, to
strike African American jurors, when, as the district court noted,
African Americans in St. Louis were more likely to rent than to own
their own homes."m' Nevertheless, the court rejected the Batson
challenge. 3 ' The circuit court in United States v. Roberts, addressing
prosecutorial justifications that it called "lame" and "fantastic," stated
that the district court had "expressed particular concern" about one of
the prosecutor's justifications. One of the jurors had "indicated she
ha[d] a number of sons who grew up in Gary,"2'0 and the prosecutor
had asserted that the juror might, as a result, "associate with the
defendant ... albeit subconsciously." 2 4' Despite its concern that
"'Juror 5 raised a family in Gary' [might] be a euphemism for 'Juror 5
is black,' " the district court permitted the strike.24 2 In United States v.
Thomas, the district court described as "suspicious" the prosecution's
explanation for exercising peremptory strikes against the only two
unconscious bias]."); Page, supra note 224, at 171 ("There is a conflict between the
[Supreme] Court's language that suggests a subjective intent requirement and the
Court's statements endorsing the use of evidence that will not invariably illuminate
the attorney's state of mind.").
236 See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and
Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 149, 170 (2010) ("[Wle could also
routinely attempt to assess the implicit biases of potential jurors. Courts could
administer computer or hand-written bias sensitivity tests to potential jurors and
share the results with the lawyers before voir dire.").
237 United States v. Adams, 604 F.3d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 2010).
238 Id. (affirming district court's rejection of Batson challenge).
239 United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 998-99 (7th Cir. 1998).
240 Id. at 998.
24 Id.
242 Id. at at 999, 1000 (affirming district court's rejection of Batson challenge). The
circuit court noted that "the population of Gary was 81% black when the 1990 Census
was taken." Id. at 999.
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African Americans left on the venire.c Despite its suspicion, the
district court permitted the strike.2 *
Rather than emphasizing their duty to create the "right climate in
the courtroom,"2 and ensure a fair trial,246 trial courts often
emphasize the absence of a duty to investigate possible discrimination
in jury selection, even in the face of troubling facts. Appellate courts
affirm this approach. In United States v. Dejesus and United States v.
Uwaezhoke, for example, the circuit courts declared that where the
defendant "did not rely 'upon the alleged disparate impact of a
tendered explanation, the trial judge [had no] duty to stop in the
middle of the voir dire and consider whether the tendered explanation
may have [had] such an impact.' "'247 In Roberts, the circuit court noted
that the district court had not discussed the "unsettling fact that the
prosecutor challenged a black elementary school teacher but not a
white elementary school teacher," even though the stated reason -
"that elementary teachers tend to find that there are no bad kids,
consequently, would be also not neutral towards the government's
case" - applied to all elementary school teachers. 24 9 However, the
circuit court described this omission as "understandable"2"o and
affirmed.25' After all, a judge "is not required to discuss a feature of the
case that eluded the attention of counsel."252
2 United States v. Thomas, 943 F. Supp. 693, 697 (E.D. Tex. 1996) ("'[The
ultimate inquiry for the judge is not whether counsel's reason is suspect, or weak, or
irrational, but whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the
challenge is not race-based.'" (quoting United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368,
1375 (5th Cir. 1993))).
244 Id. at 698.
245 See Johnson, Batson Ethics, supra note 4, at 507 ("[Alsking questions and
demanding real responses before approving strikes is part of setting the right climate
in the courtroom, a task that every good trial judge recognizes as part of his job.").
246 See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) ("The statutory prohibition on
discrimination in the selection of jurors, 18 U.S.C. § 243, enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Enabling Clause, makes race neutrality in jury selection a
visible, and inevitable, measure of the judicial system's own commitment to the
commands of the Constitution. The courts are under an affirmative duty to enforce
the strong statutory and constitutional policies embodied in that prohibition.").
247 United States v. Dejesus, 347 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 393 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993)).
248 United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 998 (7th Cir. 1998).
249 Id. at 999.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.; see also United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006)
("Here, the prosecution offered as its only reason for dismissing venire members
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Even when jury selection results in the emblematic threat of
courtroom unfairness - the all-white jury presiding over the trial of a
non-white defendant2 53 - trial judges tend to lament that fact and
their powerlessness to address it.' In Thomas, the trial court stated,
while rejecting the defendant's Batson claim, that "it must be
emphasized that the signal of injustice that the selection of an all-
white jury sends to a black defendant is not lost upon the court."255
The presiding judge, Judge Justice, promised that "[hiereafter, the
prosecutor's reasons for excluding minority venire members will be
heavily scrutinized," 5 6 and that "if evidence is presented in future
trials that excluding venire members on the basis of marital status has
a disparate impact on minorities, it may be appropriate to find that the
use of such characteristic is pretextual."" Unfortunately, Judge Justice
died before publishing another Batson decision; therefore, we do not
know what this heavy scrutiny might have achieved.25 8
In this group of cases, the hope that trial judges would conduct
careful and well-supported analyses of the racial dynamics of each case
also often remains unrealized. For example, trial courts often fail to
state their rationales when determining whether racial discrimination
is at play. In Wylie v. Vaughn, the court noted that "while the
prosecutor struck two African American venirepersons from the panel,
two African Americans did in fact serve as jurors."2 59 In Uwaezhoke,
the circuit court found that, as the trial court had stated, 6 0 the
Small, O'Neal, and Taylor that they had family members who had been convicted of
crimes. It is undisputed that four of the white venire members that the prosecution
did not strike also had family members convicted of crimes. But Houston never
brought this fact to the attention of the court, even though the court gave him ample
opportunity to do so.").
253 See Colbert, supra note 6, at 5 ("Since the beginning of slavery, the all-white
jury has represented the ultimate obstacle to justice for African-American criminal
defendants.").
254 In United States v. Beverly, the circuit court mentioned that "the final make up
of the jury" is one of the circumstances pertinent to an evaluation of the prosecutor's
credibility, yet without further reference to this standard affirmed the denial of the
Batson challenge relating to a strike that removed the only African American from the
jury. 369 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2004).
255 United States v. Thomas, 943 F. Supp. 693, 698 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
256 Id.
257 Id.
2" Douglas Martin, William Wayne Justice, Judge Who Remade Texas, Dies at 89,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/
16/us/16justice.html.
259 Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
260 United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 1993).
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prosecutor's explanation for striking an African American "was
buttressed by the fact that the government had earlier had repeated
opportunity to challenge the black juror who in fact served on Mr.
Uwaezhoke's jury, and declined to do so."261 In Sayrie v. Penrod
Drilling Corp., the circuit court found that the district court "properly
considered the fact that one of the empaneled jurors was black in
making its ultimate determination that Sayrie had not established
purposeful discrimination."2 62
The reasoning behind the judges' statements in these three cases is
not explained. It appears, however, that these judges assume that the
striking of a juror of a particular race is less likely to have been
discriminatory if the striking attorney did not use every opportunity to
remove every possible juror of that race from the jury.163 This
261 Id.
262 Sayrie v. Penrod Drilling Corp., No. 95-30259, 1995 WL 581672, at *3 (5th Cir.
Aug. 31, 1995) (noting that "[wlhen a black juror is accepted by the party alleged to
have violated Batson, the contention that its peremptory strikes were based solely on
race is weakened"). Circuit courts share with district courts the tendency to find that
anything other than complete whiteout supports a finding of no purposeful
discrimination. See United States v. Dejesus, 347 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2003)
("Another factor that makes the government's race-neutral explanation more
believable is that one Hispanic and three African Americans were seated in the final
jury, and the government had three peremptory strikes remaining."); United States v.
Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 920 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The removal of [the jurors at
issue] still left a majority-female jury that included two African Americans. This being
the case, we are unable to conclude that the district court's determination that the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges were free of race and gender bias was clearly
erroneous."); Ellis v. Newland, 23 F. App'x 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[it is not
insignificant that two other African-American women did serve on the jury. While this
alone does not insulate the prosecutor's conduct from Batson scrutiny, it cuts in favor
of the trial court's ultimate determination that the prosecutor acted in a race-neutral
manner."); United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting, in
support of its upholding of the district court's denial of the Batson challenge, that "[als
seated, the jury had ten white and two black members, about the same ratio as the
venire, yet the prosecutor had enough unused challenges to have struck the two black
jurors"). In Dejesus, the Court described as "without merit" defense counsel's claim
that the prosecution "did not strike the remaining minority jurors in order to avoid an
appearance of racial prejudice since it had already used its first two strikes against
African Americans." Dejesus, 347 F.3d at 509 n.6.
263 The EJI Report examines a similar phenomenon in Arkansas, where "courts
repeatedly have found that the presence of any African American on a jury is strong
evidence that the prosecution has not engaged in racial discrimination." EJl REPORT,
supra note 10, at 26 (calling this approach "overly simplistic"); see also Paul Butler,
Rehnquist, Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1041-42 (2006)
(stating that given the known prevalence of implicit bias, judges in "race cases" should
"closely examine their own process of interpretation. The best way to do this is to
require an articulation of supporting values and principles. Minimalist opinions in
2012] 1395
HeinOnline  -- 45 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1395 2011-2012
University of California, Davis
assumption is at odds with both common sense and what is known
about the use of race in jury selection. Common sense suggests that
litigating attorneys are aware of the standards and risks pertaining to a
Batson challenge. Thus, attorneys would presumably know not to
strike every possible juror of a particular race. Furthermore, common
sense squares with what has been learned about the use of race in jury
selection from internal training videos and manuals that have surfaced
from prosecutors' offices.264 These materials instruct prosecutors on
strategic responses to characteristics such as race.2 65 Prosecutors in
Philadelphia, for example, were told that because of Batson they
should avoid "routinely striking all African-American veniremen,"266
and instead aim to secure "sufficient African-American representation
so as to avoid racial questions." 2 67 There is every reason to think that
discrimination in jury selection is exercised strategically, and that
leaving a token member of a particular race on the jury would be
perfectly consistent with a desire to evade Batson's protections.268
In the cases involving strikes of jurors of color and/or female jurors,
unexplained assertions relating to racial considerations were not
confined to the race of seated jurors. In Wylie, for example, the court
found it "extremely unlikely that the prosecutor's exercise of his right
of peremptory strike against the African American jurors was racially
motivated as three of the principal witnesses for the prosecution were
African American. "269 The court did not explain why the race of the
three witnesses should be a determinative factor. It also failed to
race cases would be suspect").
264 See EJI REPORT, supra note 10, at 16; see, e.g., Lark v. Beard, 495 F. Supp. 2d
488, 493-94 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that former prosecutor Jack McMahon, caught on
camera giving jury selection tips to fellow prosecutors, "advocated using race, gender,
occupation, and neighborhood to pick juries in capital cases in Philadelphia County").
265 See EJI REPORT, supra note 10, at 16. Recent research suggests that these
considerations are still at play. See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras
Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 95 (2008) ("[A] 2005 survey revealed that every lawyer
interviewed considered race and gender when picking a jury. Indeed, although they
recognized that such strikes are impermissible, lawyers listed some of the following
stereotypes that they rely on in jury selection: 'Asians are conservative, African-
Americans distrust cops. Latins are emotional. Jews are sentimental. Women are hard
on women.'").
266 Lark, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
267 Id. (noting that the prosecutor's ideal was "8 whites and 4 blacks").
268 See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 250 (2005) ("This late-stage decision
to accept a black panel member willing to impose a death sentence does not . . .
neutralize the early-stage decision to challenge a comparable venireman . . . . In fact, if
the prosecutors were going to accept any black juror to obscure the otherwise
consistent pattern of opposition to seating one, the time to do so was getting late.").
269 Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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acknowledge the risk that, regardless of who the witnesses might have
been, the prosecutor wanted African Americans off the jury because of
a perceived "sympathy factor" connecting the potential jurors and the
defendant.270
Finally, none of the disparate impact cases addressing claims of
discrimination against jurors of color and/or female jurors mentioned
the risk of unconscious bias on the part of juror, attorney, or judge.
This summary indicates some of the ways in which the trial judges'
role in these cases has proved disappointing. The Supreme Court
carved out a role for trial judges that deserved deference, that offered
freedom to choose Batson procedures, and that came with important
duties and consequences. As a result, one would hope for judicial
action that is proactive, creative and assertive. Yet these cases often
demonstrate a sense of powerlessness and an emphasis on the court's
lack of duty. The Supreme Court carved out a role for trial judges that
is no doubt difficult, requiring them first to detect, and then to
declare, discrimination on the part of fellow members of the bar. As a
result, one would hope for judicial action that is careful and well
supported. Yet one often finds judicial reliance on assumptions about
race that lack rationale and are unsupported by what is known about
the role of race in jury selection.
The next section analyzes the role that trial judges played in those
cases where white jurors were stricken. Trial judges dealing with these
purposeful discrimination claims demonstrated a greater degree of
boldness and assertiveness than in the cases described above.
2. White Jurors
In Wynn and Taylor, the district court judges played the kind of
bold and proactive role that one might hope for from those seeking to
root out a phenomenon that both requires and defies detection. In
responding to a claim that defense counsel had purposefully
discriminated against white jurors, the Wynn court began by
emphasizing the need for the court to play a robust role. The court
noted that peremptory strikes are to be exercised only "under the
270 See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 800 F. Supp. 144, 153 (D.NJ. 1992). One finds
similarly questionable reasoning at the circuit court level, as in Houston, in which the
court noted as a factor supporting the finding of no discriminatory intent the fact that
"the prosecutor was of the same race as the defendant." United States v. Houston, 456
F.3d 1328, 1337 (11th Cir. 2006). Again, if we assume that discriminatory selection is
done strategically, there seems no merit to the idea that a prosecutor would not
implement such a strategy in the case of a defendant of his or her own race.
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careful control of the court,"27 and "close scrutiny is to be employed
at all times during the selection of a jury to ensure that expressions of
racial prejudice find no place in the exercise of peremptory
challenges."272 The judge accompanied his words with deeds,
indicating his lack of hesitation to discuss frankly his concerns about
the presence of racial discrimination. Defense counsel's assertion that
he struck a juror because his client did not like the way that he looked
at him received the blunt judicial response of "Yes, because he's
white."273
Similarly, in Taylor, the magistrate judge responded to defense
counsel's proffered justification for striking a white juror with a
declaration that "the reason you feel better about other people is
because of race."274 The district judge in Taylor also signaled his
intention to conduct a bold investigation into the role of racial
considerations, by asking both sides to submit affidavits stating
whether race was a factor in the decision to strike each of the disputed
jurors. 275 The judge harvested a rich crop. Defense counsel provided a
statement that proved central to the district court's analysis, namely
that "[fior every juror who was excluded, there were a number of
factors. For some jurors, race is a factor. In no juror was race the sole
factor."276 The prosecution's statement asserted that "[blecause [one
juror's] accent is Hispanic, it cannot be honestly said that her ethnicity
played no factor in our decision to strike her. It is our position,
however, that we would have exercised a challenge to a white person
with an equally heavy accent." 277 Thus, both sides admitted that
characteristics subject to Batson scrutiny - race and ethnicity -
played at least some role in their decision-making.
To those who have expressed doubt regarding the usefulness of
2781
judicial questioning in attempting to uncover bias, one could
respond with the results in Taylor. One could also respond that bias is
certainly less likely to be uncovered without judicial questioning.
Regardless of whether an attorney would ever provide a full answer to
271 United States v. Wynn, 20 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 1997).
272 Id
273 Id. at 18.
274 United States v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995).
275 United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1322 (2d Cir. 1996).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1330.
271 See Sommers & Norton, supra note 226, at 269 ("[E]ven when attorneys
consider race during jury selection, there is little reason to believe that judicial
questioning will produce information useful for identifying this bias.").
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judicial questions about the factors that motivated a strike, it is surely
part of a judge's duty to expose attorneys who exercise questionable
strikes to searching inquiry.
Another subject of potential judicial concern - composition of the
jury - reveals a further contrast between the two sets of cases. In
cases involving jurors of color and/or female jurors, the formation of
an all-white jury in the trial of a non-white criminal defendant was
sometimes noted,280 and sometimes noted with regret. Yet nothing
was done to prevent it. After all, the Equal Protection Clause does not
guarantee the right to any particular jury composition. 2 In Taylor,
however, one finds explicit concern that the jury should represent a
cross-section of the community, even though a heavily minority jury
is not associated with the same history of repression as an all-white
jury. in the first trial in this series of cases, the district judge seemed
concerned that the jury, which was "approximately 80% Black and
28521Latino, was not representative. 6 In the second trial, however,
where five out of twelve jurors were black and/or Hispanic, in a
community where members of those groups comprised forty-two
percent of the voting age population, the court was content that the
jury was representative. With pride, the district judge looked back at
his work and asserted that " [t]he composition of this jury shows that
it is possible to assemble a jury made up of a cross-section of the
community without tolerating wholesale violations of the rights
conferred by the Equal Protection Clause."a2 Thus, events in the first
279 See Johnson, Batson Ethics, supra note 4, at 507 ("[A]sking questions and
demanding real responses before approving strikes is part of setting the right climate
in the courtroom, a task that every good trial judge recognizes as part of his job.").
280 United States v. Thomas, 943 F. Supp. 693, 697 (E.D. Tex. 1996). See supra
note 255 and accompanying text.
281 See Thomas, 943 F. Supp. at 698.
282 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 552, 538 (1975). Nor does the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990).
283 See United States v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995) (noting that in the first of the "coalition" trials a jury was
selected that did not represent a fair cross-section of the community and the right of
the prospective jurors to the equal protection of the laws was blatantly violated).
284 See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 6, at 119 ("The predominantly black jury was
neither a badge or incident of slavery nor a symbol of whites' second-class citizenship;
the white crime victim would find it extremely difficult to discover historical evidence
showing that predominantly nonwhite juries have been unable to reach impartial
verdicts.").
285 United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1329 (2d Cir. 1996).
286 Taylor, 1995 WL 875460, at *11.
287 Id.
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trial seemed to motivate the judge, even though that trial had involved
no Batson challenges... and, in all but one instance, different defense
attorneys. " The trial judge even concluded, despite the absence of
Batson challenges, that the Equal Protection Clause had been
"blatantly violated" in that earlier trial.290 The extent to which he and
Magistrate Judge Ross reached into the earlier trial to support their
findings of discrimination in the later trial became grounds for
appeal.29'
Thus, the district court judges in Wynn and Taylor played a bolder
and more proactive role in addressing allegations of purposeful
discrimination than those in the first group of cases. In word and
deed, they indicated a willingness to address potential bias directly
and to conduct a thorough inquiry. They did not go so far as to refer
explicitly to the role of unconscious bias in the decisions of jurors,
judges, or attorneys, but the conclusion in Wynn at least demonstrated
an expansive view of the types of bias that the Batson doctrine does,
and must, address: " [T]he peremptory challenge now must be closely
scrutinized to ensure that even the most subtle forms of racism are
eliminated from the [sic] today's jury system."292
B. Connection of the Justification to the Facts of the Case
A requirement that the justification proffered for a peremptory
strike have some connection to the facts of the case hAs proven
popular within Batson jurisprudence. Batson itself indicated that a
striking attorney's task at Step 2 is to "articulate a neutral explanation
related to the particular case to be tried."293 Although in Purkett v.
Elem294 the Supreme Court stripped away this requirement of a
connection to the facts of the case at Step 2, some federal courts have
continued, undaunted, to require that connection; 295 others restrict
their inquiry to Step 3.
288 id.
289 id.
290 Id. (noting that in the first of the "coalition" trials, discriminatory use of
peremptory strikes had "proceeded without objection").
291 United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1325-26 (2d Cir. 1996).
292 United States v. Wynn, 20 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 1997) (emphasis added)
(adding that "[niot only does the Constitution demand such a result, the integrity of
the judicial system and the public confidence in this system depend upon such a
result").
293 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
294 See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995).
295 One even cited Purkett in doing so. See Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208
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1. Jurors of Color and/or Female Jurors
In cases analyzing disparate impact arguments, a connection
between the proffered justification and the facts of the case is
frequently used as a factor to help determine whether disparate impact
was the product of purposeful discrimination.2 9 6 It makes sense that
one's suspicion about the genuineness of a justification would increase
as the justification's relevance decreases. However, the use of this
factor raises two concerns for those who fear that disparate impact
justifications do not receive sufficiently careful scrutiny.
First, there is danger in concluding that a connection to the facts of
the case is sufficient to inoculate a disparate impact justification from
a charge of purposeful discrimination.297 A strike that violates the
comparability principle - one that is applied to jurors of one race or
gender but not to similarly-situated jurors of another race or gender -
provides an obvious example of a strike that might be tightly bound to
the facts of the case and yet strongly suggest pretext.
Second, the concept of "connection to the facts of the case," if
interpreted loosely, threatens to catch large swathes of people within
its net" and allow a significant disparate impact to go unchecked
where, as discussed below,9 it might be most troubling. One example
of loose usage can be found in decisions where judges refuse to
require that attorneys alleging a connection with the facts of the case
F.3d 847, 855 (10th Cir. 2007) ("An explanation for the strike is race-neutral so long
as the reason is related to the case and does not deny equal protection." (citing
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769)).
296 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 604 F.3d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding
government's peremptory strikes against two African Americans alleged to have "an
insufficient stake in the community"); Heno, 208 F.3d at 855 (noting that "[s]upport
for affirmative action and feeling discriminated against in the workplace are reasons
clearly related to an employment discrimination case"); United States v. Moeller, 80
F.3d 1053, 1060 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding government's peremptory challenges
against one African American and two Hispanic jurors without high school educations
on the ground that "the complex nature of the conspiracy, and the number of
interconnected offenses alleged" adequately supported the district court's acceptance
of the prosecution's justifications).
297 See, e.g., Lewis v. Bennett, 435 F. Supp. 2d 184, 192 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (" [Tihe
Batson analysis recognizes that a race-neutral reason may be rational and still be a
pretext for discrimination.").
298 See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and jury Selection:
Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 511, 591 (1994) ("Highly subjective,
vague and unsubstantiated prosecutorial claims are routinely accepted. In fact,
generous acceptance of such reasons, more than any other fact, explains the paucity of
findings of discrimination post-Batson.").
2 See infra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
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make a showing of resultant bias.00 When the second problem is
combined with the first, a great number of potential jurors are
vulnerable to removal solely because of justifications that, under vague
and broad standards, are held to have a "connection to the facts of the
case."
These concerns are particularly salient in the disparate impact
context because many of the justifications alleged to have a disparate
impact can also be said, depending on how close a connection one
requires, to be connected to the facts of the case. Education level, for
example, was upheld as a justification where the facts of the case were
alleged to be complex, despite defense counsel's argument that
disparate education was "a continuing badge of slavery.""' Support for
affirmative action and an experience of feeling discriminated against in
the workplace were deemed to have a vital connection to the facts of
the case in an employment discrimination suit.02 Several of the other
proffered justifications whose alleged disparate impact was litigated
could also be said to have a connection to the facts of the case. These
include the assertion that a juror lives near the alleged base of
300 In Heno, for example, the court found that support for affirmative action and
feeling discriminated against in the workplace are reasons clearly related to an
employment discrimination case, but gave no indication of a requirement that a
resulting bias be shown. See Heno, 208 F.3d at 855 (adopting the position of the
striking attorney, namely that any juror who "felt they had been the victim of
discrimination, whether it was gender, race, religion, age, what have you, that that
perception was sufficient to make them unable to serve as a juror and evaluate the
evidence fairly"). In Adams, the defendant argued before the trial court that the
prosecutor's reasons for the strikes - status as renters, assumed to indicate an
insufficient stake in the community, and dissatisfaction with law enforcement
response to crimes committed against the venirepeople - were pretextual because
"the government had failed to ask follow-up questions that would probe the jurors'
responses, particularly regarding the renters' ties to the community." Adams, 604 F.3d
at 601. This argument was rejected by the district court, whose decision was found
not to be clearly erroneous by the appellate court. Id. In Canoy, the appellate court
affirmed the district court's acceptance of the prosecution's justification that a
potential juror might have trouble understanding English, even though the trial court
had noted that the potential juror "had not exhibited any difficulty speaking or
understanding English when questioned by the court." United States v. Canoy, 38
F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994).
301 Moeller, 80 F.3d at 1060 ("Defendants argue that Batson jurisprudence should
recognize disparate education as a continuing badge of slavery. We do not exclude the
possibility that their argument may have merit in another case. In this case, however,
the complex nature of the conspiracy, and the number of interconnected offenses
alleged, adequately support the district court's determination that the prosecution
articulated adequate race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes.").
302 Heno, 208 F.3d at 855.
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operations of the defendant's gang 03 or in the same area as the
residence of the alleged victim,304 a witness,"3  or the defendants.3 01
Language abilities may also be presented as relevant to the facts of a
case when a juror's ability to accept a translated version of testimony,
rather than the original version, is questioned.30 7
More troubling, justifications of the type most often challenged in
this set of cases - alleged connections between potential jurors and
some aspect of law enforcement or the criminal justice system -
could provide a connection between the potential jurors and the facts
of any criminal case. Judges do not display vigilance in policing the
risk that significant disparate impact could be accomplished and, as a
result, that a significant opportunity for purposeful discrimination
could go unchecked, through unthinking acceptance of such a
connection as sufficient to inoculate a strike. In United States v.
Houston, for example, the circuit court declared without elaboration
that the district court "viewed the exclusion of those whose family
members had criminal histories as 'very legitimate.' "3" In United
States v. Johnson, the trial court declared, with respect to a potential
juror whose brother had a criminal conviction, that "it's objectively
reasonable in a criminal case that somebody who's had such [an] event
occur in the immediate family would be a less suitable juror." "3
The lack of inquiry into whether a connection with law enforcement
or the criminal justice system automatically validates a strike,
whatever its disparate impact, suggests an assumption that a potential
juror with such a connection would have a negative view of the
prosecution's case. If courts allow prosecutors to strike anyone with
such a connection, they risk losing perspectives that may be essential
to the ideal of a jury made up of diverse experiences and viewpoints.o
303 See Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1992).




307 See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 800 F. Supp. 144, 156 (D.N.J. 1992).
308 United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1337 (11th Cir. 2006).
301 United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting the
trial judge).
310 See, e.g., State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1142 (2004) (describing the NewJersey
rule that "makes possible a diversity of perspectives that fosters an 'overall impartiality
of the deliberative process'" (quoting State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986))); John
Gastil, Do Juries Deliberate? A Study of Deliberation, Individual Difference, and Group
Member Satisfaction at a Municipal Courthouse, 38 SMALL GROUP RES. 337, 354 (2007),
available at http://sgr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/3/337 (noting that "the
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If courts accept without question the assumption that those who have
experienced the criminal justice system will have a negative view of
the prosecution, there is no incentive for governmental authorities to
consider reforming the system so that those who have experienced it
do not necessarily harbor such a negative view."
While some courts make "connection to the facts of the case" a low
bar, others seem to dispense with the requirement entirely, even in the
face of disparate impact arguments. The circuit court in DeJesus, for
example, was unpersuaded by defense counsel's argument that "the
reasons offered by the government for the strikes . . . were completely
irrelevant to the stricken jurors' ability to perform as jurors in a
particular case." 312 The court responded that "Batson does not require
the party to show that the reason articulated is relevant to a juror's
suitability."3 13
Thus, one argument advanced by those courts that resist a searching
inquiry into the connection of a proffered justification to the facts of
the case is that peremptory strikes are designed to be distinguishable
from challenges for cause.3 11 It is true that the peremptory challenge
has long been viewed as " 'an arbitrary and capricious species of
more [ideologically] diverse juries were actually more likely to scrutinize the judge's
instructions").
311 For related policy arguments, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW
129-30 (2010) ("[Sleemingly race-neutral factors such as 'prior criminal history' are
not truly race-neutral. A black kid arrested twice for possession of marijuana may be
no more of a repeat offender than a white frat boy who regularly smokes pot in his
dorm room. But because of his race and his confinement to a racially segregated
ghetto, the black kid has a criminal record, while the white frat boy, because of his
race and relative privilege, does not."), and Johnson, Batson Ethics, supra note 4, at
506 ("If a case cannot stand examination by twelve jurors who fairly represent the
community, it should fail . . . . And if race relations are so bad in a jurisdiction that
adherence to these standards produces more than a few wrongful acquittals, it is time
for everyone to know about it.").
312 United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2003).
313 Id; see also Ware v. Filion, No. 04 Civ. 6784 (PAC)(FM), 2007 WL 1771583, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2007) (upholding rejection of Batson claim where prosecution
claimed to have struck an African American juror because "IsIhe was raising her
grandchildren and that tells me that her children are not raising her grandchildren
and that disturbed me and that indicated that her own children aren't working out so
well and I didn't want her on the jury for that reason," despite no apparent connection
with the facts of the case).
314 See, e.g., United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 394 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993).
("We do not, of course, suggest that the information available to the government
would support a finding that Ms. Lucas, more probably than not, would be an
unqualified juror, or even an undesirable juror from the government's point of view.
But that is not what peremptory challenges are all about."). For the difference between
a peremptory challenge and a challenge for cause, see supra note 25.
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challenge.' " "Yet fidelity to this concept may have to yield, given that
a procedure designed to ensure fairnesS 316 stands accused of being
"intrinsically discriminatory.""' At least in the area of disparate
impact, where so many difficulties attend the task of detecting
purposeful discrimination, it seems wise for trial courts to conduct a
more meaningful inquiry into an alleged connection to the facts of the
case than one sees in this group of cases."
2. White Jurors
In comparison to the cases involving jurors of color and/or female
jurors, the Taylor district judge conducted a more rigorous
"connection to the facts of the case" analysis. In discussing the
defendants' argument, which Magistrate Judge Ross had accepted, that
they "sought jurors who had been in the workplace, and [who] had
been exposed to a broad array of opinions and experiences,"319 the
315 John P. Bringewatt, Snyder v. Louisiana: Continuing the Historical Trend Towards
Increased Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2010)
(quoting Blackstone).
316 See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); Bringewatt, supra note
315, at 1284.
" Brian Wais, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Revisions to the Batson Doctrine
and Peremptory Challenges in the Wake ofJohnson v. California and Miller-El v. Dretke,
45 BRANDEls L.J. 437, 439 (2007) ("[Alny kind of selection of jurors, particularly
when a person can be struck for non-legal reasons, will fundamentally be predicated
on discrimination of some form. Due to this intrinsically discriminatory nature of
peremptory challenges, discrimination can probably never be entirely eradicated from
peremptory challenges or jury selection as a whole."); see State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d
1150, 1162 (1986) ("Permitting questioning of the use of peremptory challenges to
determine whether they stem from presumed group bias does not eviscerate them.
Historically, it may well have been that the right to exercise peremptory challenges
was, 'as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be exercised
with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose.' But English society in 1305 (and for
that matter in 1789) was a relatively homogeneous society; it knew not the forms of
arbitrary, capricious, or invidious discrimination against discrete groups that beset our
heterogeneous society. In our society today, the statutory right must be exercised
within constitutional bounds, which forbid such arbitrariness and capriciousness, or it
fails of its purpose of securing an impartial jury." (quoting Lewis, 146 U.S. at 378)).
318 See Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to
Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 501, 532
(1999) ("When the challenging attorney states that the reason for the strike is the
residence of the juror, and when the juror lives near the defendant, in a high crime
area, or in public housing, it does not follow that the juror and the striking party have
similar perspectives and that therefore the juror cannot be fair and impartial. That
error in logic excludes everyone who lives 'on the wrong side of town,' which usually
has a direct correlation with race.").
319 United States v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *8
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district judge pointed out that neither the defendants nor Magistrate
Judge Ross had explained why "such a juror would be either more or
less desirable in this case."" Thus, employment status, a factor
frequently used and accepted without much question in cases
involving jurors of color and/or female jurors,321 failed to satisfy the
court here. Indeed, the district judge's approach led the defendants to
argue on appeal that in the case of one juror the judge had required
them to present reasons that "rose to the level of a challenge for
"32232cause," an argument that the appellate court rejected.323 While it is
important to recall that the Taylor courts required this connection
from defense counsel as part of a dual motivation analysis,324 the
requirement may provide an example of how a more rigorous
"connection to the facts of the case" analysis is possible, and desirable,
in disparate impact cases, whether or not a dual motivation analysis is
applied.3 25
The Wynn court, in dealing with excluded white jurors, was also
more rigorous in its "connection to the facts of the case" analysis than
some of the cases involving jurors of color and/or female jurors. The
judge was unmoved by defense counsel's argument that people from
the northwest of Washington D.C. were undesirable to the defense
(E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995).
320 Id.
321 See Devoil-El v. Groose, 160 F.3d 1184, 1184 (8th Cir. 1998); Sayrie v. Penrod
Drilling Corp., No. 95-30259, 1995 WL 581672, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1995);
United States v. Davenport, No. 93-1216, 1994 WL 523653, at *6 (5th Cir. Sept. 6,
1994); Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
322 United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1328 (2d Cir. 1996).
323 The circuit court made clear that in the dual motivation context it was
appropriate to require "reasons for challenging that had some relationship to the
case," and that such a requirement "is not the same as requiring a challenge to be for
cause." Id. The circuit court noted that the language used by the district court - that
the defendants had to explain the manner in which "the race-neutral characteristic is
'related to the particular case to be tried' " - came "directly from Batson," and that
"[allthough there may be some dispute as to the meaning of that language" given
Purkett, that case "dealt only with the burden on the proponent of a challenge to a
juror to produce a race-neutral reason for it." Id.
324 See id.; Taylor, 1995 WL 875460, at *1, *5.
325 It should also be noted that the appropriateness of the court's decision to apply
a "dual motivation" analysis was contested on appeal to the Second Circuit. Taylor, 92
F.3d at 1327. Among other arguments, the defense contested the assertion that it had
conceded that race was a substantial factor in its decisions regarding peremptory
strikes. Id. at 1327-28. Defense counsel also argued that "because the government
admitted that ethnicity was a factor in its decision to challenge juror 8, the court
should have applied the dual motivation analysis to this challenge." Id. at 1330
(emphasis added).
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because they would have had fewer encounters, or fewer negative
encounters, with the police.3 26 As mentioned above, residence and
experience with police were commonly used and accepted as
justifications in the cases involving jurors of color and/or female
jurors,m with little, if any, requirement that a specific connection to
the facts of the case be shown. In Wynn, the court conceded that
"[a] party may be permitted to rely on residence to justify the use of a
peremptory challenge '[wihere residence is utilized as a link
connecting a specific juror to the facts of the case.' "329 However,
without even acknowledging defense counsel's attempt to show a
connection with the facts of the case, the Wynn court concluded that
this was a situation where "residence of jurors has no cognizable
connection to the facts of [the] particular case"330 and, therefore, that
"it can only be stated that residence is nothing more than a proxy for
race."33 ' The lack of connection to the facts of the case persuaded the
court that disparate impact was the product of discriminatory
purpose.332
Thus, the white juror cases applied higher standards to the concept
of a "connection to the facts of the case" than the cases involving
strikes of jurors of color and/or female jurors. The Taylor and Wynn
courts sought an indication not only that the trait in question existed
in the individual juror, but also that it was desirable to the party
opposing the strike. Under these standards, factors relating to
employment status, residence, and experience with policing, which
generally proved to be safe havens in the cases involving jurors of
color and/or female jurors, were found wanting. By contrast, courts
assessing claims relating to jurors of color and/or female jurors failed
to acknowledge the presence of a "connection to the facts of the case"
requirement in Step 2 of Batson's original framework and the
usefulness of this factor as a way to evaluate disparate impact claims.
326 See United States v. Wynn, 20 F. Supp. 2d 7, 14 (D.D.C. 1997).
327 See supra Section Ii.B.1.
328 See id.
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C. Comparability
Comparability is another tool that courts often use when trying to
determine whether disparate impact is the product of purposeful
discrimination. Its logic is simple: if a justification was used to strike,
for example, an African American juror but not a similarly situated
white juror, the credibility of that justification is impaired. However,
two questions immediately arise: what does it mean for jurors of
different races to be similarly situated, 3 " and what should the
consequences be when the comparability principle is violated?
1. Jurors of Color and/or Female Jurors
In this larger group of cases involving jurors of color and/or female
jurors, courts rejected attempts to use the comparability principle
where only one of the multiple reasons given for striking a juror also
applied to a juror who was allowed to sit.334 Some courts went further
and required that the jurors being compared be the same in all
respects, an approach that all but guarantees that the jurors will not be
found to be similarly situated, especially when attorneys engage in the
practice of offering "shopping lists" of traits by way of justification. 335
In Devoil-El v. Groose, for example, the prosecution used a number of
justifications that the defense alleged had a disparate impact:
unemployment, having a relative in jail, dissatisfaction with the police,
having been charged with a crime, and having been a crime victim.33 6
The defendant argued that these justifications "were pretextual
because Caucasian jurors sharing the same characteristics were not
removed."33 ' The court affirmed the rejection of the Batson challenge,
however, because in the case of all but one of the jurors at issue, the
jurors "were removed for a combination of reasons, such as being
unemployed and having a relative in jail, which distinguished them
333 For one state court's attempt to grapple with this problem, see State v. Marlowe,
89 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Mo. 2002) ("In this case, the stricken venireperson is 'really'
similarly situated to the white juror/venireperson.").
334 See Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, 253 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001)
("[W]here a party gives multiple reasons for striking a juror, it is not enough for the
other side to assert that the empaneled juror shares one attribute with the struck
juror."); Devoil-El v. Groose, 160 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1998).
31 Johnson, Batson Ethics, supra note 4, at 490 ("Because a racist prosecutor can
simply add traits to a shopping list to achieve a combination that no white juror
possesses, some courts have viewed shopping-list claims with disfavor. None,
however, have invoked a per se rule against such lists, regardless of their length.").
3" Devoil-El, 160 F.3d at 1186.
3' Id. at 1187.
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from the non-challenged Caucasian venirepersons. "338 Thus, by piling
one characteristic alleged to have disparate impact on top of another,
the prosecution was able to ensure that the comparability test was no
test at all.
When parties raised comparability arguments on appeal, the
arguments were defeated because the circuit courts had a limited view
of their role.33 9 Even though the district court in United States v.
Roberts had failed to address the "unsettling" fact that the only
difference between a challenged and an unchallenged juror was the
race of the two jurors,340 the court deemed that omission
"understandable" where counsel had failed to call the discrepancy to
the trial judge's attention.3 1' The circuit court in United States v.
Houston affirmed the denial of a Batson claim relating to the
prosecution's proffered justification for dismissing three African
American jurors - that they had family members who had been
convicted of crimes - even though it was undisputed that four of the
white jurors, whom the prosecution had left unchallenged, also had
family members who had been convicted of crimes."' Defense
counsel's failure to bring this fact to the trial court's attention, "even
though the court gave him ample opportunity to do so," thwarted his
claim. Thus, the limited role that appellate courts play in
comparability analysis emphasizes still more strongly the importance
of the trial judge's role.
The second question raised by the comparability test is what the
consequences should be when it is not satisfied. Outside the disparate
impact context, some courts have viewed a finding of pretext as a
necessary consequence of a failure to satisfy the comparability test.344
338 Id.
339 See, e.g., Williams v. Chrans, 957 .F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
"substitute [its] judgment for that of the state court," despite feeling "considerable
unease").
34 See United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1998).
341 Id. ("[A] judge is not required to discuss a feature of the case that eluded the
attention of counsel.").
342 United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006).
343 Id.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting justifications because not applied in a consistent manner); United States v.
Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1544-46 (11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting justification because
applied inconsistently); Love v. Scribner, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1223 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(finding prosecutor's "uneven application" of voir dire principles to be "evidence of
pretext").
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Some commentators endorse this approach.34 5 Yet in the disparate
impact context, this approach has not always governed.4 In
Franklyn," for instance, an inconsistency in the application of a
justification - the prosecutor struck an African American on grounds
related to her employment as an attorney while leaving a white
attorney on the jury - was found insufficient to create an inference of
discriminatory intent.4
While comparability has the potential to aid claims that disparate
impact is the product of purposeful discrimination, it also has the
potential to destroy such claims if a violation of the comparability
principle is deemed essential to a viable claim of purposeful
discrimination. In Davis v. Purkett, for example, where the petitioner
alleged that using knowledge of an area that was "almost virtually one
hundred percent African American" as a justification was pretextual, it
appears that the absence of a comparator played a large part in
defeating the Batson challenge. 3 49 The state appellate court noted that
"the defendant has failed to identify any similarly-situated
venirepersons who escaped the state's challenge."3 50 In light of that
fact, "coupled with the trial court's holding that the prosecutor is
known to the court and has not engaged in racist behavior," the
appellate court declared itself unable to find the denial of the Batson
challenge clearly erroneous. On habeas review, the appellate court's
conclusion was upheld.m
The flaw in the Purkett analysis is that the very essence of a
disparate impact justification, namely the fact that it is more likely to
apply to one race or gender than another, increases the chance that
there will be no comparator. Even if there is a comparator, a
3 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp,
39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 178, 187 n.47 (2007) (arguing that one should be
required to strike all jurors with the same "trait or quality, regardless of race," if one is
exercising suspect exclusion (citing Joshua E. Swift, Batson's Invidious Legacy:
Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 336, 361-66 (1993))).
346 See United States v. Franklyn, No. S1 96 CR. 1062 (DLC), 1997 WL 334969, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y June 16, 1997).
3 Id.
348 id.
34 Davis v. Purkett, No. 4:06CV1041-DJS, 2008 WL 4449427, at *16-17 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 26, 2008).
350 Id. at *17.
351 See id.
35 See id.
3 The EJl Report indicates that a similar analytical weakness is found in the
Alabama courts, which "have been reluctant to grant Batson relief in recent years
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justification that permits the strike of a disparate number of jurors of
color or female jurors should not be inoculated from challenge. One
should be skeptical, for example, of approaches such as that taken by
the circuit court in Tinner," which rejected a disparate impact
argument where the same question - whether the potential jurors
knew or had heard of anyone who filed a discrimination claim - had
been asked of all potential jurors.5 If courts are to make a meaningful
effort to screen disparate impact justifications, there should be no hint
that a violation of the comparability principle is a sine qua non of a
Batson challenge.
As applied in these cases, the comparability principle is of little use
to those making disparate impact claims. Requiring jurors to be
identical in all respects severely limits the likelihood that the test can
ever be applied. Failure to provide a comparator may doom a Batson
claim; by contrast, success in meeting the test may be deemed
insufficient to establish pretext. Once a case is before the appellate
courts, they may see themselves as powerless to address any apparent
violations of the comparability principle.
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El, which rejected an
interpretation of "comparability" that would require absolute
identity, 5 creates hope that the lower courts will be vigilant about the
risk of requiring a comparison so exact that the test becomes
meaningless. It also creates hope that the appellate courts will play a
more robust role in this area.3 " However, the fact that neither the
magistrate judge nor the district judge in Purkett made any reference
to this Supreme Court precedent, even while upholding a questionable
state court comparability analysis,5 raises concerns that lower courts
are not fully realizing Miller-El's potential.
without evidence of disparate treatment." EJI REPORT, supra note 10, at 27; see also
ALEXANDER, supra note 311, at 100 ("[B]lacks and whites are almost never similarly
situated (given extreme racial segregation in housing and disparate life
experiences).").
" See Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 706 (7th Cir. 2002) ("It is
far-fetched to assert that United challenged Mrs. Clardy because of her race when all
potential jurors were questioned on the same grounds.").
3 See id.
316 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 247 n.6 (2005) (pointing out that such a
requirement would nullify the test).
. See Deana Kim El-Mallawany, Johnson v. California and the Initial Assessment of
Batson Claims, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3333, 3349 (2006) ("[In Miller-El v. Dretke
(Miller-El II), the Supreme Court again signaled to appellate courts that they should
be more vigilant in reviewing trial court determinations of credibility.").
35. Davis v. Purkett, No. 4:06CV1041-DJS, 2008 WL 4449427, at *17 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 26, 2008).
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2. White Jurors
In contrast to the cases involving jurors of color and/or female
jurors, the Wynn court anticipated Miller-El in its flexible approach to
comparability. The court signaled that its interpretation of the
comparability principle would be a versatile one by stating that
"pretext can be demonstrated by evidence that stricken panel members
of one racial group are similarly situated or share the characteristics of a
non-stricken panel member of a separate racial group."3 5 9 While the
precise import of this alternative formulation is not clear, it suggests
an adaptable approach that is absent from the cases dealing with
stricken jurors of color and/or female jurors.
The court then demonstrated this flexibility by permitting
comparability analysis even when the jurors being compared shared
only one trait.3"o For example, the court conducted a comparability
analysis involving "age," even though that was only "one of the
explanations" for striking three of the jurors; it revealed that three
African American jurors were seated, even though they were older
than the white jurors who had been stricken on the basis of age.36' The
court performed a similar analysis with two additional characteristics,
each considered in isolation: connections with individuals working in
law enforcement and the nature of certain jurors' employment.362
Violation of the comparability principle - at least where the disparity
was "gross" - led the court to the "only plausible conclusion,"
namely that defense counsel wanted to remove all white jurors
through peremptory strikes and, thus, that defense counsel's
justifications were pretextual.363
The Taylor district court also illustrated a broad view of the
comparability principle. Indeed, its view was so broad that it was
willing to examine jurors in a different trial as part of its analysis.364
The court referred to a trial in a related case, even though it involved
different defendants and, in all but one instance, different defense
359 United States v. Wynn, 20 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 1997) (emphasis added).
360 See id. at 14.
361 See id.
362 See id.
363 See id. (acknowledging that "[slome circuits have observed that an explanation
for a peremptory challenge, though weakened, is not automatically to be rejected
because it applies to members of other racial groups who were not challenged").
* See United States v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995) ("[1]n the preceding trial, the first of the so-called coalition
cases, there were several young African-American jurors who presumably lacked life
experience and who were not challenged.").
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attorneys.365 The defendants objected to this approach in their appeal,
but although the circuit court found it to be "troubling" "at first
blush," it did not view it as grounds for reversal.3 6 6
Thus, in contrast to the straitened view of comparability that
frequently impeded claims relating to jurors of color and/or female
jurors, the courts in Wynn and Taylor applied a view that, anticipating
Miller-El, examined comparability more flexibly. These courts
stretched the doctrine beyond its narrow confines, and, in Taylor,
stretched it into questionable terrain.
D. Rights of the Potential Jurors
Finally, this article turns to the rights of potential jurors within the
Batson doctrine. As with the previous three factors, a comparative
analysis demonstrates that the two groups of cases take contrasting
approaches to this issue.
1. Jurors of Color and/or Female Jurors
Despite the fact that Batson's aims included protecting jurors from
discrimination in jury selection,67 the cases involving jurors of color
and/or female jurors, with only one exception, do not mention the
rights of those jurors in their analysis .3 68 This is true even though each
of the cases under consideration post-dated the Supreme Court's
explicit recognition of the constitutional dimension of those rights in
Powers.369 It is also true even though, in the civil cases, the jurors were
the only identifiable individuals whose rights were at stake.
By contrast, in many instances courts seemed to feel compelled, in
the course of analyzing allegations of discrimination against jurors of
color and/or female jurors, to offer apparently gratuitous examples of
strikes of white jurors - as if those stricken white jurors called out
for attention. The Tinner court, for example, addressed an argument
that defense counsel's question to potential jurors about whether they
knew of anyone who had filed a discrimination claim was, when
365 See United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1319 n.3 (2d Cir. 1996).
366 See id. at 1329.
367 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
368 The exception is United States v. Hibbler, 193 F. App'x. 445, 450 (6th Cir.
2006). The Hibbler court stated that "[ei xercising peremptory challenges based on the
race of prospective jurors violates those potential jurors' equal protection rights, and
the party opposing the party exercising the challenges in that discriminatory way has
standing to litigate those jurors' rights." Id. at 450.
369 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
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directed toward the only African American juror, the equivalent of
asking her "[alre you black?" or "[wiere any of your ancestors
slaves?" 370 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument, noting that
every member of the venire was asked the same question, and
concluding that the fact that the African American juror's sister had
filed a discrimination claim "amount[ed] to coincidence, not
purposeful discrimination." 3 ' The court stated that the argument that
a Batson violation had occurred was "interesting,"3 7 ' because that line
of questioning led the plaintiff to strike the other juror who answered
affirmatively. Defense counsel, it was noted, "did not object to the
strike of [this juror], who was white." 3 3 Similarly, in Roberts, the court
included, apparently not for any reason related to the claims of the
parties, a prominent reference to the strikes of whites. Its Batson
discussion began as follows:
The defense exercised all ten of its peremptory challenges
against white persons; the prosecution removed two of the six
black members of the pool, and left half of its challenges
unexercised. Yet it is the defendant who complains about the
use of racial criteria in jury selection.7
Thus, in both Tinner and Roberts, the court inserted into the Batson
discussion references to white jurors who were stricken, despite their
legal irrelevance to the question before the court, namely whether
jurors of color had been the victims of purposeful discrimination. The
opinions in this group of cases said almost nothing about the rights of
jurors of color and/or female jurors.
370 Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2002).
371 Id. at 706.
372 Id. at 706 n.6.
373 Id. ("Tinner's argument is interesting in that he relied on United's questioning
to exercise a peremptory strike of his own. Tinner challenged Mr. Kuester, whose
company had discrimination charges filed against it in the past. Presumably, Tinner
excluded Mr. Kuester because he fell on the side of 'management,' and Tinner's
counsel wanted to ensure a more plaintiff-friendly jury panel. United did not object to
the strike of Mr. Kuester, who was white. This type of challenge in jury selection is
crucial to the functioning of our adversarial legal system. Just as Tinner's challenge of
Mr. Kuester is not indicative of a purposeful effort to exclude whites, United's
challenge of Mrs. Clardy is not indicative of its efforts to systematically exclude
African-Americans.").
3 United States v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998, 998 (7th Cir. 1998).
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2. White Jurors
By contrast, both the Wynn and Taylor district courts explicitly
invoked the rights of potential jurors to be free from discrimination."
One might find this unsurprising, given that when prosecutors bring
Batson challenges, the defendants' rights are not being asserted: the
only identifiable individuals whose constitutional rights are in
question are the potential jurors. It is worth noting, however, that at
the time of these decisions, as now, the Supreme Court had made no
definitive pronouncement that a defense attorney violates Batson when
he or she strikes white jurors on the basis of their race.37 ' Neither
Wynn nor Taylor mentioned this jurisprudential lacuna. Rather, each
district judge cited Supreme Court precedent that could be argued to
support a claim of this nature, but which does not do so explicitly.
From the available Supreme Court precedents, Wynn chose to cite
McCollum, which had held that a prosecutor could bring a claim on
behalf of a stricken juror." By contrast, Taylor cited J.E.B. v. ex rel
T.B., which had held that a civil litigant could bring a claim of gender
discrimination on behalf of a stricken juror?.3 " The courts' failure to
acknowledge the stretch of reasoning that would be required in order
to get from the cited precedent to the decisions in the white juror
cases is surprising. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissenting
opinion in J.E.B., up until that decision, all of the Court's post-Batson
decisions had dealt with claims relating to strikes of "blacks,"
"Hispanics," or "Latinos."371 Still more noteworthy in the case of
McCollum is the fact that Justice Thomas noted in his concurring
opinion that "[elventually, we will have to decide whether black
defendants may strike white veniremen."so The Wynn court was
apparently not inclined to wait.
In addition, the district court's opinion in Taylor demonstrates a
phenomenon that mirrors the way in which the cases involving jurors
of color and/or female jurors mentioned strikes of potential white
3" United States v. Wynn, 20 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v.
Taylor, No. 93 CR 711 (ERK), 1995 WL 875460, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995).
376 See Frank, supra note 72, at 2092 n.126 ("Although no U.S. Supreme Court
precedent addresses this issue, some lower courts have extended Batson to the
exclusion of white jurors.").
3n Wynn, 20 F.Supp. 2d at 15 (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58
(1992)).
37 Taylor, 1995 WL 875460, at *5 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct.
1419, 1426-27 (1994)).
See id. at 155 n.* (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
38 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62 (Thomas, CJ., concurring).
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jurors, even when the constitutionality of those strikes was not being
litigated. As the circuit court opinion reveals, even though the district
court dealt with Batson claims from both the prosecution and the
defense, its opinion omitted all details of the defense's Batson claim,
which alleged that the prosecution had purposefully discriminated
against Latinos with two of its strikes."' It is as if, again, the rights of
non-white jurors were less compelling.
Thus, in Wynn and Taylor, one finds courts pushing at the
boundaries of Supreme Court precedent in their searching analysis of
claims relating to the striking of white jurors. The picture is similar in
the three other areas with which this article is concerned: these cases
make bold use of the freedom granted to the trial judge, and use the
"connection to the facts of the case" and "comparability" tests to inject
depth and meaning into Step 3, in a way that presages the relative
muscularity of Miller-El. By contrast, in the cases analyzing claims
relating to the strikes of jurors of color and/or female jurors, the
courts appear hemmed in by a straitened view of their role and of
Supreme Court precedent. A Supreme Court doctrine rooted in the
need to protect African Americans has, at least in the context of
published disparate impact claims,382 been interpreted with depth and
vigor only in the service of protecting whites. While this irony may
not be unusual in the Equal Protection context,383 it merits scrutiny.
" Taylor, 92 F.3d at 1330 ("Judge Korman accepted without comment the
Magistrate's finding that the government had not based its challenges to jurors 8 and
17 on race and her decision to sustain those challenges.").
382 There is a pattern of Batson analysis resulting in findings of discrimination against
white jurors more often than against African American jurors beyond the disparate
impact context, and beyond the federal courts. See Melilli, supra note 8, at 456.
383 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (upholding Batson gender
discrimination claim brought on behalf of male jurors); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991) (upholding Batson racial discrimination claim brought by white defendant);
Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163,
268 (2002) (arguing that in the racial profiling context, courts fail to require the
"colorblindness" required elsewhere, and, even while proposing a revision of Equal
Protection doctrine in this context, noting that "simply applying this doctrine would
be a major step forward"); Lisa Crooms, "Everywhere There's War": A Racial Realist's
Reconsideration of Hate Crimes Statutes, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 41, 57 (1999) (noting
that "hate crime ordinances fail to provide adequate protection to African-Americans,
while race-based penalty enhancement mechanisms afford whites more protection
from racially-motivated violence"); Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2
UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 1, 8 (1992) ("It is no accident that a majority of equal protection
sex discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court have been brought by men. It
is no accident that the hot racial issue in equal protection doctrine is 'reverse
discrimination' challenges to affirmative action plans, that is, claims by white people
that they are victims of racism." (footnote omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
The disparity between outcomes in the two groups of disparate
impact cases is stark. Of thirty-six published decisions involving
allegedly discriminatory strikes of jurors of color and/or female jurors,
none ended in a finding of purposeful discrimination. Of three
published decisions involving allegedly discriminatory strikes of white
jurors, all ended in a finding of purposeful discrimination.
In addition to this disparity in outcome, a further disparity in
approach merits examination. In response to the Supreme Court's
mandate that "appropriate weight" be given to disparate impact, one
finds the Wynn and Taylor courts adopting methods that are largely
absent from the cases involving jurors of color and/or female jurors,
and that are astute. They endorse an informed, proactive role for the
trial judge; they ensure that the "connection to the facts of the case"
requirement is not too loose, and the "comparability" requirement is
not too tight, to be meaningful; and they weigh within their Batson
analysis the fact that every allegation of a discriminatory strike
involves an allegation that a juror has been the victim of
discrimination.
Courts involved in Batson analysis, no less than critics calling for its
abandonment as pointless, should heed the risk of disparities in
outcome and in approach. Until an attempt is made to minimize any
such disparities, one cannot legitimately call the peremptory system
fair, and one cannot legitimately call for its abandonment.
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